银行的风险承担:"亲身参与 "真的重要吗?

IF 1.3 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
{"title":"银行的风险承担:\"亲身参与 \"真的重要吗?","authors":"","doi":"10.1057/s41261-024-00235-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>The belief that bank capital helps improve stability takes for granted the idea that increases in capital are an incentive to reduce risk-taking because bank owners would have more to lose (skin-in-the-game) if their banks fail. Nevertheless, given the higher cost of capital as compared to debt, it is also possible that increases in capital would lead to higher risk-taking due to the need for banks to boost their returns. In light of these contradictory possibilities, we exploit exogenous variations of capital to empirically investigate the actual effects of capital on risk-taking. Our analyses based on a sample of nearly 1900 US Banking Holding Companies in the 1990–2020 period indicate that increasing capital actually leads to higher risk-taking, which contradicts the skin-in-the-game hypothesis. We show evidence that this relationship could be explained by the consequent increase in funding costs that creates pressure for better returns, which is normally achieved by means of taking higher risk. Our main findings are robust to a number of alternative model and sample specifications.</p>","PeriodicalId":15105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Risk-taking in banks: does skin-in-the-game really matter?\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1057/s41261-024-00235-0\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>The belief that bank capital helps improve stability takes for granted the idea that increases in capital are an incentive to reduce risk-taking because bank owners would have more to lose (skin-in-the-game) if their banks fail. Nevertheless, given the higher cost of capital as compared to debt, it is also possible that increases in capital would lead to higher risk-taking due to the need for banks to boost their returns. In light of these contradictory possibilities, we exploit exogenous variations of capital to empirically investigate the actual effects of capital on risk-taking. Our analyses based on a sample of nearly 1900 US Banking Holding Companies in the 1990–2020 period indicate that increasing capital actually leads to higher risk-taking, which contradicts the skin-in-the-game hypothesis. We show evidence that this relationship could be explained by the consequent increase in funding costs that creates pressure for better returns, which is normally achieved by means of taking higher risk. Our main findings are robust to a number of alternative model and sample specifications.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15105,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Banking Regulation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Banking Regulation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-024-00235-0\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Banking Regulation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-024-00235-0","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要 银行资本有助于提高稳定性的观点认为,增加资本是减少风险承担的一种激励措施,因为如果银行倒闭,银行所有者会有更大的损失(利益受损),这是理所当然的。然而,与债务相比,资本成本较高,因此,由于银行需要提高收益,增加资本也有可能导致更高的风险承担。鉴于这些相互矛盾的可能性,我们利用资本的外生变化来实证研究资本对风险承担的实际影响。我们基于 1990-2020 年间近 1900 家美国银行控股公司的样本进行的分析表明,增加资本实际上会导致更高的风险承担,这与 "游戏规则 "假说相矛盾。我们有证据表明,这种关系的原因可能是融资成本随之增加,从而产生了获得更高回报的压力,而这通常是通过承担更高风险来实现的。我们的主要发现对一些替代模型和样本规格都是稳健的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Risk-taking in banks: does skin-in-the-game really matter?

Abstract

The belief that bank capital helps improve stability takes for granted the idea that increases in capital are an incentive to reduce risk-taking because bank owners would have more to lose (skin-in-the-game) if their banks fail. Nevertheless, given the higher cost of capital as compared to debt, it is also possible that increases in capital would lead to higher risk-taking due to the need for banks to boost their returns. In light of these contradictory possibilities, we exploit exogenous variations of capital to empirically investigate the actual effects of capital on risk-taking. Our analyses based on a sample of nearly 1900 US Banking Holding Companies in the 1990–2020 period indicate that increasing capital actually leads to higher risk-taking, which contradicts the skin-in-the-game hypothesis. We show evidence that this relationship could be explained by the consequent increase in funding costs that creates pressure for better returns, which is normally achieved by means of taking higher risk. Our main findings are robust to a number of alternative model and sample specifications.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
3.70
自引率
6.20%
发文量
21
期刊介绍: Under the guidance of its highly respected Editors and an eminent and truly international Editorial Board?Journal of Banking Regulation?has established itself as one of the leading sources of authoritative and detailed information on all aspects of law and regulation affecting banking institutions.Journal of Banking Regulation?publishes in each quarterly issue detailed briefings analyses and updates which are of direct relevance to practitioners working in the field while meeting the highest intellectual standards.Journal of Banking Regulation?publishes the latest thinking and best practice on:Basel I II and IIIModels for banking supervisionInternational accounting standardsDeposit protectionEnforcement decisions in banking regulation and supervisionCross-border competition in banking servicesCorporate governance in banksHarmonisation in banking marketsSupervising credit riskAnti-money laundering legislation and regulationsMonetary integrationRisk capital and capital adequacySystemic risk in banking operationsCross-border regulationCross-border bank insolvencyModels for banking riskEssential reading for:central bankersbanking supervisorsfinancial regulatorsbankerscompliance officersheads of risk managementpolicy makersbank associationslawyers specialising in banking lawaccountantsinternal and external bank auditorsacademics and researchers
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信