感知意义和证据敏感论证

IF 1.4 3区哲学 Q2 ETHICS

Philosophical Psychology Pub Date : 2024-03-08 DOI:10.1080/09515089.2024.2325549

Yavuz Recep Başoğlu

引用次数: 0

摘要

各种意义幻觉似乎对反证不敏感。也就是说，与视觉中著名的穆勒-莱尔错觉类似，某些意义错觉似乎对反证不敏感。

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Perceiving meaning and the argument from evidence-insensitivity

Various illusions of meaning appear to be insensitive to counter-evidence. That is, in a similar fashion to the well-known Müller-Lyer illusion in vision, certain illusions of meaning seem not to f...

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来源期刊

Philosophical Psychology Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

14.30%

发文量

120

期刊介绍： Philosophical Psychology is an international journal devoted to developing and strengthening the links between philosophy and the psychological sciences, both as basic sciences and as employed in applied settings, by publishing original, peer-refereed contributions to this expanding field of study and research. Published articles deal with issues that arise in the cognitive and brain sciences, and in areas of applied psychology.