当猪不满意,不如当植物满意

Ethan C. Terrill, Walter Veit
{"title":"当猪不满意,不如当植物满意","authors":"Ethan C. Terrill, Walter Veit","doi":"10.1007/s10806-024-09922-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the last two decades, there has been a blossoming literature aiming to counter the neglect of plant capacities. In their recent paper, Miguel Segundo-Ortin and Paco Calvo begin by providing an overview of the literature to then question the mistaken assumptions that led to plants being immediately rejected as candidates for sentience. However, it appears that many responses to their arguments are based on the implicit conviction that because animals have far more sophisticated cognition and agency than plants, and that plants should not have the same moral status as animals, plants should not have any moral status. Put in simpler terms: it is not as bad to eat plants than to eat, say, pigs. While there are still uncertainties around comparative moral and policy implications between animals and plants, given a gradualist account of quasi-sentience and partial moral status, both of which we claim are a matter of degree, we may not have to abolish our convictions by declaring that plants have no sentience or moral status at all. Indeed, we can hold two things at the same time: that animals and plants have moral status, but animals have <i>prima facie</i> more moral status than plants.</p>","PeriodicalId":501152,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Better to be a Pig Dissatisfied than a Plant Satisfied\",\"authors\":\"Ethan C. Terrill, Walter Veit\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10806-024-09922-4\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In the last two decades, there has been a blossoming literature aiming to counter the neglect of plant capacities. In their recent paper, Miguel Segundo-Ortin and Paco Calvo begin by providing an overview of the literature to then question the mistaken assumptions that led to plants being immediately rejected as candidates for sentience. However, it appears that many responses to their arguments are based on the implicit conviction that because animals have far more sophisticated cognition and agency than plants, and that plants should not have the same moral status as animals, plants should not have any moral status. Put in simpler terms: it is not as bad to eat plants than to eat, say, pigs. While there are still uncertainties around comparative moral and policy implications between animals and plants, given a gradualist account of quasi-sentience and partial moral status, both of which we claim are a matter of degree, we may not have to abolish our convictions by declaring that plants have no sentience or moral status at all. Indeed, we can hold two things at the same time: that animals and plants have moral status, but animals have <i>prima facie</i> more moral status than plants.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":501152,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-024-09922-4\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-024-09922-4","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去的二十年里,旨在反驳忽视植物能力的文献如雨后春笋般涌现。米格尔-塞贡多-奥尔廷(Miguel Segundo-Ortin)和帕科-卡尔沃(Paco Calvo)在最近发表的论文中,首先对相关文献进行了概述,然后对导致植物被立即拒绝作为有知觉的候选者的错误假设提出了质疑。然而,对他们论点的许多回应似乎都基于这样一种隐含的信念,即由于动物的认知和能动性远比植物复杂,植物不应该具有与动物相同的道德地位,因此植物不应该具有任何道德地位。简单地说:吃植物并不比吃猪坏。尽管在动物与植物的道德和政策影响比较方面仍存在不确定性,但鉴于我们对准知觉和部分道德地位的渐进主义解释(我们声称这两者都是程度问题),我们可能不必宣布植物根本没有知觉或道德地位,从而取消我们的信念。事实上,我们可以同时持有两种观点:动物和植物都具有道德地位,但动物的道德地位表面上高于植物。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Better to be a Pig Dissatisfied than a Plant Satisfied

In the last two decades, there has been a blossoming literature aiming to counter the neglect of plant capacities. In their recent paper, Miguel Segundo-Ortin and Paco Calvo begin by providing an overview of the literature to then question the mistaken assumptions that led to plants being immediately rejected as candidates for sentience. However, it appears that many responses to their arguments are based on the implicit conviction that because animals have far more sophisticated cognition and agency than plants, and that plants should not have the same moral status as animals, plants should not have any moral status. Put in simpler terms: it is not as bad to eat plants than to eat, say, pigs. While there are still uncertainties around comparative moral and policy implications between animals and plants, given a gradualist account of quasi-sentience and partial moral status, both of which we claim are a matter of degree, we may not have to abolish our convictions by declaring that plants have no sentience or moral status at all. Indeed, we can hold two things at the same time: that animals and plants have moral status, but animals have prima facie more moral status than plants.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信