作为司法不公的推迟起诉协议:对公司便利的探索性研究

Petter Gottschalk
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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多国家在怀疑存在公司犯罪时都会采用推迟起诉协议和类似安排。这是一种以谈判为基础的协议,如果被指控有罪的一方在特定时间内避免再犯不法行为,则允许其不接受刑事审判。本文根据公司实际有罪和公司实际无罪两种不同情况对此类协议进行评述。签署此类协议的无辜公司会遭受误判。另一方面,有罪的公司可以恢复实施公司犯罪的便利。本文认为,推迟起诉协议违反了基本的司法原则。研究表明,严重欺诈办公室和其他公共机构需要恢复,以便在怀疑存在公司不法行为时能够进行彻底的刑事起诉。这一建议基于这样一个假设,即根本问题是执法部门在调查和起诉公司犯罪方面无能为力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Deferred prosecution agreements as miscarriage of justice: An exploratory study of corporate convenience

Deferred prosecution agreements and similar arrangements are practiced in many countries when there is suspicion of corporate crime. It is an agreement based on a negotiation that permits the allegedly guilty party not to undergo a criminal trial if they avoid committing further wrongdoing for a specified period of time. This article reviews such agreements in light of two different situations where the corporation is actually guilty and where the corporation is actually not guilty. An innocent company signing such an agreement suffers from miscarriage of justice. A guilty company on the other hand can restore the convenience of committing corporate crime. This article argues that deferred prosecution agreements violate basic principles of justice. The research suggests that serious fraud offices and other public bodies need to be restored to enable complete criminal prosecution when there are suspicions of corporate wrongdoing. This suggestion is based on the assumption that the underlying problem is law enforcement incompetence at investigating and prosecuting corporate crime.

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