友好的董事会和资本分配效率

Avishek Bhandari, Md Nazmul Hasan Bhuyan, Meena Subedi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了友好型董事会对资本配置效率的影响。我们提供的证据表明,拥有友好型董事会的公司对资本配置效率低下有积极的、统计上显著的影响。我们发现,不同的友好型董事会和资本配置效率衡量标准、替代模型规格、遗漏变量偏差、自我选择偏差和其他内生性问题都能使我们的结果保持稳健。我们还发现,在外部公司治理质量高的公司中,友好型董事会与资本配置低效率之间的正相关性较低,但在财务约束高的公司中,这种正相关性较高。研究结果表明,在友好型董事会的公司中,董事会监督不力和代理冲突较多导致资本配置效率低下。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Friendly boards and capital allocation efficiency
This study examines the effect of friendly boards on capital allocation efficiency. We provide evidence that firms with friendly boards have a positive and statistically significant effect on capital allocation inefficiency. We find our results robust to different measures of friendly boards and capital allocation inefficiency, alternative model specifications, omitted variable bias, self‐selection bias and other endogeneity concerns. We also show that the positive association between friendly boards and capital allocation inefficiency is lower in firms with high external corporate governance quality but higher in firms with high financial constraints. The findings imply that poor board monitoring and high agency conflicts in firms with friendly boards lead to high capital allocation inefficiency.
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