聚集分布式能源资源:效率与市场力量

Zuguang Gao, Khaled Alshehri, John R. Birge
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摘要

问题定义:分布式能源资源(DER)的迅速发展是全球电力系统最重大的变化之一。DER 的例子包括太阳能电池板、电力存储、热存储和热电联产电厂。由于这些 DER 的供应能力较小,让它们直接参与电力批发市场并不现实。我们在本文中研究了如何将这些 DER 供应纳入电力市场的问题,目的是实现充分的市场效率。方法/结果:我们研究了四种聚合模型,其中有一个聚合器,在了解 DER 的效用函数和发电量后,从 DER 处采购电力,并在批发市场上出售。在第一种聚合模型中,利润最大化的聚合器向 DER 所有者公布了一种由两部分组成的差别定价政策。我们的研究表明,该模型保留了完全的市场效率,也就是说,该模型实现的社会福利与 DER 直接参与批发市场时的社会福利相同。在第二种聚合模型中,追求利润的聚合者被迫对来自同一地点的用户实行统一的两部分定价政策,我们通过数值计算表明,这种情况下可能会出现较大的效率损失。在第三种(第四种)聚合模型中,对 DER 所有者采用统一(半统一)的两部分定价政策,而聚合器则完全受管制,但保证非负(正)利润。结果表明,这些模型再次实现了完全的市场效率。此外,我们还表明,DER 聚合还能降低传统发电商的市场支配力。管理意义:加利福尼亚州独立系统运营商和纽约州独立系统运营商等已对通过追求利润和/或受监管的聚合器进行 DER 聚合进行了调查,最近联邦能源管理委员会第 2222 号命令为聚合器在批发市场竞标铺平了道路。我们的四种聚合模式可能会对 DERs 应如何纳入电力批发市场有所启示:本研究得到了法赫德国王石油和矿业大学(King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals)[INML2106]和美国国家科学基金会(National Science Foundation)[1832230]的资助:在线附录见 https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0539 。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power
Problem definition: The rapid expansion of distributed energy resources (DERs) is one of the most significant changes to electricity systems around the world. Examples of DERs include solar panels, electric storage, thermal storage, and combined heat and power plants. Because of the small supply capacities of these DERs, it is impractical for them to participate directly in the wholesale electricity market. We study in this paper the question of how to integrate these DER supplies into the electricity market, with the objective of achieving full market efficiency. Methodology/results: We study four aggregation models, where there is an aggregator who, with the knowledge of DERs’ utility functions and generations, procures electricity from DERs, and sells them in the wholesale market. In the first aggregation model, a profit-maximizing aggregator announces a differential two-part pricing policy to the DER owners. We show that this model preserves full market efficiency, that is, the social welfare achieved by this model is the same as that when DERs participate directly in the wholesale market. In the second aggregation model, the profit-seeking aggregator is forced to impose a uniform two-part pricing policy to prosumers from the same location, and we numerically show that there can be large efficiency loss. In the third (fourth) aggregation model, a uniform (semiuniform) two-part pricing policy is applied to DER owners, whereas the aggregator becomes fully regulated but is guaranteed nonnegative (positive) profit. It is shown that these models again achieve full market efficiency. Furthermore, we show that DER aggregation also leads to a reduction in the market power of conventional generators. Managerial implications: DER aggregation via profit-seeking and/or regulated aggregators has been investigated by California Independent System Operator and New York Independent System Operator, among others, and the recent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No. 2222 paved the way for aggregators to bid in the wholesale market. Our four aggregation models may shed light on how DERs should be included in the wholesale electricity market.Funding: This work was supported by the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals [Grant INML2106] and the National Science Foundation [Grant 1832230].Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0539 .
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