英国的破产:管理者是否只说不做?

IF 4.5 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Yousry Ahmed, Mohamed Elsayed, Bin Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了管理者是将年报文本披露作为传达未来公司破产概率的渠道,还是由于印象管理激励而故意误导利益相关者。我们围绕英国非结构化年报中文本披露所传达的基调信息内容和公司破产概率进行了各种研究。我们发现,传达更积极信息基调的公司破产风险较低。重要的是,我们发现,由于董事会监督更严格、股市监管更严格以及四大会计师事务所审计更严格,管理者误导投资者的动机更低的公司,这种关联性更强。我们还提供了补充证据,表明传达更积极净基调的公司表现出更高的未来业绩和盈利持续性,以及更低的未来业绩波动性。这些公司也不太可能采取极端的公司政策,也不太可能收到保留审计意见。总之,本研究揭示了管理者倾向于告知还是误导(将头埋在沙子里)企业破产。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bankruptcy in the UK: Do Managers Talk the Talk Before Walking the Walk?

This study examines whether managers employ annual report textual disclosures as a conduit to communicate the probability of future corporate bankruptcy or to intentionally mislead stakeholders owing to impression management incentives. We conduct various examinations around the information content of the tone conveyed by textual disclosures in unstructured UK annual reports and the probability of corporate bankruptcy. We document that firms that communicate a more net positive tone are associated with lower bankruptcy risk. Importantly, this association is found to be stronger for firms whose managers have a lower incentive to mislead investors owing to better board monitoring, stringent stock market regulation, and Big 4 audits. We also offer complementary evidence that firms conveying a more net positive tone exhibit higher future performance and earnings persistence, and lower future performance volatility. These firms are also less likely to exhibit extreme corporate policies and to receive a qualified auditor's opinion. Overall, this study sheds light on whether managers tend to inform or misinform (bury their heads in the sand) about corporate bankruptcy.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
12.50%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: The British Journal of Management provides a valuable outlet for research and scholarship on management-orientated themes and topics. It publishes articles of a multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary nature as well as empirical research from within traditional disciplines and managerial functions. With contributions from around the globe, the journal includes articles across the full range of business and management disciplines. A subscription to British Journal of Management includes International Journal of Management Reviews, also published on behalf of the British Academy of Management.
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