Intrinsic dignity

Dignity has often been used to signify a ground for a particularly serious kind of moral consideration, the scope of which has been debated. Therefore, I argue that an inclusive conception of dignity is central in determining the normative aims of education, and the moral responsibilities that adult teachers should have in learning relationships with children. The aim of the paper is to argue for a view of dignity as a regulative ideal beyond the dichotomy of moral agents and patients that can be (imperfectly) realized through moral perfectionism. In this article I show how commonly held neo-Aristotelean and neo-Kantian interpretations that view dignity as an intrinsic value grounded in certain capacities, mainly the capacity for reason, can have limiting implications for the view of children as moral subjects. By presenting alternative interpretations of Aristotle and Kant, I will seek to challenge these limited views on dignity and expand the conception of dignity to not only being grounded in certain capacities of moral agents and patients, but in morality itself. The argument leads to problematizing moral perfectionism in education that is not counter-balanced by moments of transcending our own intentions to be good.