Game-theoretic private blockchain design in edge computing networks

Considering the privacy challenges of secure storage and controlled flow, there is an urgent need to realize a decentralized ecosystem of private blockchain for cyberspace. A collaboration dilemma arises when the participants are self-interested and lack feedback of complete information. Traditional blockchains have similar faults, such as trustlessness, single-factor consensus, and heavily distributed ledger, preventing them from adapting to the heterogeneous and resource-constrained Internet of Things. In this paper, we develop the game-theoretic design of a two-sided rating with complete information feedback to stimulate collaborations for private blockchain. The design consists of an evolution strategy of the decision-making network and a computing power network for continuously verifiable proofs. We formulate the optimum rating and resource scheduling problems as two-stage iterative games between participants and leaders. We theoretically prove that the Stackelberg equilibrium exists and the group evolution is stable. Then, we propose a multi-stage evolution consensus with feedback on a block-accounting workload for metadata survival. To continuously validate a block, the metadata of the optimum rating, privacy, and proofs are extracted to store on a lightweight blockchain. Moreover, to increase resource utilization, surplus computing power is scheduled flexibly to enhance security by degrees. Finally, the evaluation results show the validity and efficiency of our model, thereby solving the collaboration dilemma in the private blockchain.