{"title":"知识与自我认知","authors":"Stefano Domingues Stival","doi":"10.51359/2357-9986.2023.260719","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This text will be generated by contraposition (in the broadest sense) of two concepts, which I will call “externalist conception of knowledge”, on one side, and “internalist conception of knowledge” (as a kind of psychologist evidentialism), on the other. Through this contrast, I try to reach some new insights into the relationship between the notions of “knowledge” and “self-knowledge”.","PeriodicalId":262325,"journal":{"name":"Perspectiva Filosófica","volume":"93 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Knowledge and Self-Knowledge\",\"authors\":\"Stefano Domingues Stival\",\"doi\":\"10.51359/2357-9986.2023.260719\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This text will be generated by contraposition (in the broadest sense) of two concepts, which I will call “externalist conception of knowledge”, on one side, and “internalist conception of knowledge” (as a kind of psychologist evidentialism), on the other. Through this contrast, I try to reach some new insights into the relationship between the notions of “knowledge” and “self-knowledge”.\",\"PeriodicalId\":262325,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Perspectiva Filosófica\",\"volume\":\"93 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Perspectiva Filosófica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2023.260719\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Perspectiva Filosófica","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2023.260719","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This text will be generated by contraposition (in the broadest sense) of two concepts, which I will call “externalist conception of knowledge”, on one side, and “internalist conception of knowledge” (as a kind of psychologist evidentialism), on the other. Through this contrast, I try to reach some new insights into the relationship between the notions of “knowledge” and “self-knowledge”.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
