工资不平等的长期存在:工资历史禁令的证据

James Bessen, Erich Denk, Chen Meng
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在考虑了可观察到的差异后,女性和少数族裔的薪酬差距依然存在。最近,美国有十几个州禁止雇主查询工资记录。我们分析了这些薪资记录禁令(SHBs)对私营雇主工资发布和薪酬的影响。我们建立了一个企业在公布工资和讨价还价之间进行选择的理论模型,得出了 SHB 对不同工作类别工资的影响。然后,我们利用美国 Burning Glass 公司的职位发布数据和当前人口调查数据,采用差异设计进行了全面分析。结果表明,在实施社会福利局后,私人雇主更频繁地发布工资,并提高了跳槽者的工资,尤其是女性(6.2%)和非白人(5.8%)。这些结果表明,当雇主在讨价还价时可以获得求职者的工资记录时,他们就可以利用过去的不平等,使不平等永久化。此外,也没有证据表明在短期内存在对工人的逆向选择或雇主的逆向反应。讨价还价行为和工资历史记录的使用似乎是造成弱势转职者与其他人之间工资差异的主要原因。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Perpetuating wage inequality: evidence from salary history bans

Pay gaps for women and minorities have persisted after accounting for observable differences. Recently, a dozen US states have banned employer access to salary histories. We analyze the effects of these salary history bans (SHBs) on private employer wage posting and pay. We develop a theoretical model of firms’ choices between posting wages and bargaining, drawing out the implications of SHBs on wages for different groups of jobs. We then implement a comprehensive analysis in a difference-in-differences design, using Burning Glass job posting data in the US and the Current Population Survey. The results show that following SHBs, private employers posted wages more often and increased pay for job changers, particularly for women (6.2%) and non-whites (5.8%). The results imply that when employers can access applicants’ salary histories while bargaining over wages, they can take advantage of past inequities, perpetuating inequality. There is also no evidence of adverse selection of workers overall or adverse employer reactions in the short run. Bargaining behavior and the use of salary histories appear to account for much of the difference in pay between disadvantaged job changers and others.

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