{"title":"人工智能指导下的表演:阿伦特视角","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09962-1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>In this paper, I will investigate the possible impact of weak artificial intelligence (more specifically, I will concentrate on deep learning) on human capability of action. For this goal, I will first address Arendt’s philosophy of action, which seeks to emphasize the distinguishing elements of action that set it apart from other forms of human activity. According to Arendt, action should be conceived as <em>praxis</em>, an activity that has its goal in its own very performance. The authentic meaning of action includes the “passion” for articulation of one’s own individuality; I can only manifest myself as a distinct personality insofar as I introduce myself as a novel beginning to the web of human interactions demonstrating both my relevance and distinction from others. From this Arendtian standpoint, I will analyse the impact of deep learning in modern AI from two possible angles. First, I will argue that <em>the direct interaction</em> between AI and action is impossible. Since AI operates on the principle of efficiency, it can neither suggest certain goals for action for us nor overtake their implementation because action is not guided by the instrumental need to be efficient but by the existential desire to be someone. Second, I will also analyse the possibility of <em>the indirect impact</em> of AI on action. More specifically, I analyse neural network’s ability to circulate actions among individuals based on mathematical calculation. As I will argue, the efficiency of this circulation that surpasses human cognitive capacities can potentially organize a broader network of interaction among individuals and serve as a catalyst for the ability to act.</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"AI-informed acting: an Arendtian perspective\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11097-024-09962-1\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>In this paper, I will investigate the possible impact of weak artificial intelligence (more specifically, I will concentrate on deep learning) on human capability of action. For this goal, I will first address Arendt’s philosophy of action, which seeks to emphasize the distinguishing elements of action that set it apart from other forms of human activity. According to Arendt, action should be conceived as <em>praxis</em>, an activity that has its goal in its own very performance. The authentic meaning of action includes the “passion” for articulation of one’s own individuality; I can only manifest myself as a distinct personality insofar as I introduce myself as a novel beginning to the web of human interactions demonstrating both my relevance and distinction from others. From this Arendtian standpoint, I will analyse the impact of deep learning in modern AI from two possible angles. First, I will argue that <em>the direct interaction</em> between AI and action is impossible. Since AI operates on the principle of efficiency, it can neither suggest certain goals for action for us nor overtake their implementation because action is not guided by the instrumental need to be efficient but by the existential desire to be someone. Second, I will also analyse the possibility of <em>the indirect impact</em> of AI on action. More specifically, I analyse neural network’s ability to circulate actions among individuals based on mathematical calculation. As I will argue, the efficiency of this circulation that surpasses human cognitive capacities can potentially organize a broader network of interaction among individuals and serve as a catalyst for the ability to act.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51504,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences\",\"volume\":\"25 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09962-1\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09962-1","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I will investigate the possible impact of weak artificial intelligence (more specifically, I will concentrate on deep learning) on human capability of action. For this goal, I will first address Arendt’s philosophy of action, which seeks to emphasize the distinguishing elements of action that set it apart from other forms of human activity. According to Arendt, action should be conceived as praxis, an activity that has its goal in its own very performance. The authentic meaning of action includes the “passion” for articulation of one’s own individuality; I can only manifest myself as a distinct personality insofar as I introduce myself as a novel beginning to the web of human interactions demonstrating both my relevance and distinction from others. From this Arendtian standpoint, I will analyse the impact of deep learning in modern AI from two possible angles. First, I will argue that the direct interaction between AI and action is impossible. Since AI operates on the principle of efficiency, it can neither suggest certain goals for action for us nor overtake their implementation because action is not guided by the instrumental need to be efficient but by the existential desire to be someone. Second, I will also analyse the possibility of the indirect impact of AI on action. More specifically, I analyse neural network’s ability to circulate actions among individuals based on mathematical calculation. As I will argue, the efficiency of this circulation that surpasses human cognitive capacities can potentially organize a broader network of interaction among individuals and serve as a catalyst for the ability to act.
期刊介绍:
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.