{"title":"基于回报的销售定价模式:捆绑与附加","authors":"Tengfei Nie, Bo Song, Jianghua Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.omega.2024.103038","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>With the proliferation of e-commerce, there has been a remarkable surge in the volume of products sold online, accompanied by a corresponding increase in product returns. In order to stimulate consumer demand, retailers have adopted various promotional strategies, among which the bundling and add-on sales have emerged as the most prevalent. Nevertheless, there is currently no clearly dominant promotion model considering consumer return behavior. Consequently, we construct a game-theory model that considers product returns in the settings of an online retailer, an insurance company, and a continuum of consumers. Within our model, consumers are confronted with uncertainty regarding their valuations and only ascertain the true value of a purchased product after acquisition. Moreover, retailers must carefully consider the tradeoff between the bundling and add-on models: bundling sales may sell more products, but return products increase; on the other hand, add-on sales offer the advantage of single item returns but may result in a decrease in overall product sales. Our findings yield several noteworthy conclusions warranting further examination. First, add-on product substandard rate (Proportion of add-on products with substandard quality to all add-on products) has a significant influence on the retailer’s choice of sales model. More specifically, when the add-on product substandard rate is lower, retailers will definitely choose bundling sales. Otherwise, the retailer’s choice of sales model depends on both core product price and degree of discount. Second, in bundling sales, the better the match between core product and add-on product, the higher the retailer’s profit. However, in add-on sales, highly matched add-on product may hurt the retailer’s profit. Finally, add-on sales is a better choice for commercial groups that have both sales companies and insurance companies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":19529,"journal":{"name":"Omega-international Journal of Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Sales pricing models based on returns: Bundling vs. add-on\",\"authors\":\"Tengfei Nie, Bo Song, Jianghua Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.omega.2024.103038\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>With the proliferation of e-commerce, there has been a remarkable surge in the volume of products sold online, accompanied by a corresponding increase in product returns. In order to stimulate consumer demand, retailers have adopted various promotional strategies, among which the bundling and add-on sales have emerged as the most prevalent. Nevertheless, there is currently no clearly dominant promotion model considering consumer return behavior. Consequently, we construct a game-theory model that considers product returns in the settings of an online retailer, an insurance company, and a continuum of consumers. Within our model, consumers are confronted with uncertainty regarding their valuations and only ascertain the true value of a purchased product after acquisition. Moreover, retailers must carefully consider the tradeoff between the bundling and add-on models: bundling sales may sell more products, but return products increase; on the other hand, add-on sales offer the advantage of single item returns but may result in a decrease in overall product sales. Our findings yield several noteworthy conclusions warranting further examination. First, add-on product substandard rate (Proportion of add-on products with substandard quality to all add-on products) has a significant influence on the retailer’s choice of sales model. More specifically, when the add-on product substandard rate is lower, retailers will definitely choose bundling sales. Otherwise, the retailer’s choice of sales model depends on both core product price and degree of discount. Second, in bundling sales, the better the match between core product and add-on product, the higher the retailer’s profit. However, in add-on sales, highly matched add-on product may hurt the retailer’s profit. Finally, add-on sales is a better choice for commercial groups that have both sales companies and insurance companies.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":19529,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Omega-international Journal of Management Science\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Omega-international Journal of Management Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305048324000057\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Omega-international Journal of Management Science","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305048324000057","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
Sales pricing models based on returns: Bundling vs. add-on
With the proliferation of e-commerce, there has been a remarkable surge in the volume of products sold online, accompanied by a corresponding increase in product returns. In order to stimulate consumer demand, retailers have adopted various promotional strategies, among which the bundling and add-on sales have emerged as the most prevalent. Nevertheless, there is currently no clearly dominant promotion model considering consumer return behavior. Consequently, we construct a game-theory model that considers product returns in the settings of an online retailer, an insurance company, and a continuum of consumers. Within our model, consumers are confronted with uncertainty regarding their valuations and only ascertain the true value of a purchased product after acquisition. Moreover, retailers must carefully consider the tradeoff between the bundling and add-on models: bundling sales may sell more products, but return products increase; on the other hand, add-on sales offer the advantage of single item returns but may result in a decrease in overall product sales. Our findings yield several noteworthy conclusions warranting further examination. First, add-on product substandard rate (Proportion of add-on products with substandard quality to all add-on products) has a significant influence on the retailer’s choice of sales model. More specifically, when the add-on product substandard rate is lower, retailers will definitely choose bundling sales. Otherwise, the retailer’s choice of sales model depends on both core product price and degree of discount. Second, in bundling sales, the better the match between core product and add-on product, the higher the retailer’s profit. However, in add-on sales, highly matched add-on product may hurt the retailer’s profit. Finally, add-on sales is a better choice for commercial groups that have both sales companies and insurance companies.
期刊介绍:
Omega reports on developments in management, including the latest research results and applications. Original contributions and review articles describe the state of the art in specific fields or functions of management, while there are shorter critical assessments of particular management techniques. Other features of the journal are the "Memoranda" section for short communications and "Feedback", a correspondence column. Omega is both stimulating reading and an important source for practising managers, specialists in management services, operational research workers and management scientists, management consultants, academics, students and research personnel throughout the world. The material published is of high quality and relevance, written in a manner which makes it accessible to all of this wide-ranging readership. Preference will be given to papers with implications to the practice of management. Submissions of purely theoretical papers are discouraged. The review of material for publication in the journal reflects this aim.