下一页 欧盟新一代:哈密尔顿时刻还是欧洲新政?

Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行期间,欧洲联盟(欧盟)史无前例地在资本市场上借贷了 7,500 亿欧元,其中一部分将以赠款的形式支出。由于之前对欧盟宪法的解释倾向于认为欧盟无权进行赤字支出,因此下一代欧盟(NGEU)可以说是欧盟宪法的一次重大变革。在有关欧盟的文献中,人们经常将欧盟与美国的联邦制度进行比较:评论家们将欧盟的宪法转型比作美国的金融开国元勋汉密尔顿以及罗斯福新政所促成的转型。当美国濒临破产时,汉密尔顿提出重组并承担联邦政府资产负债表上各州的债务,从而改变了美国公共债务的格局。美国联邦政府的公债第一次在美国经济中发挥了关键作用。大萧条促使美国财政发生了又一次变革。罗斯福向选民承诺要恢复经济增长。在罗斯福任期内,美国的公共借贷大幅上升。这篇论文探讨了汉密尔顿和罗斯福的变革政策所引发的宪法争议。文章认为,尽管存在一些相似之处,但赤字支出是否符合宪法的问题在汉密尔顿时代和罗斯福时代都不存在争议。更重要的是,它认为罗斯福和汉密尔顿都对经济抱有变革性的愿景,而新政府联盟并不认同这种愿景。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
NextGenerationEU: Hamiltonian moment or European New Deal?
During the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the European Union (EU) took the unprecedented step of borrowing 750 billion euros on capital markets, part of which was to be spent in the form of grants. As prior interpretations of the Union’s constitution tended to suggest that it had no power for deficit spending, NextGenerationEU (NGEU) arguably constitutes a major constitutional transformation for the Union. As so often in the literature on the EU, the comparison was made with the federal system of the USA: Commentators likened the Union’s constitutional transformation to the transformation engineered by Hamilton, the financial founding father of the USA, as well as Roosevelt’s New Deal. When the USA was teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, Hamilton transformed the landscape of public debt in the USA by proposing to restructure and assume the debt of the states on the balance sheet of the federal government. For the first time, the public debt of the federal government of the USA played a critical role in its economy. The Great Depression prompted another transformation for the finances of the USA. Roosevelt promised his voters to bring back economic growth. During Roosevelt’s tenure in office, the public borrowing of the USA went up significantly. This contribution examines the constitutional controversies provoked by Hamilton’s and Roosevelt’s transformative policies. It argues that, in spite of some similarities, the question of the constitutionality of deficit spending was controversial neither in Hamilton’s nor in Roosevelt’s day. More fundamentally, it argues that both Roosevelt and Hamilton had a transformative vision for the economy not shared by NGEU.
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