知觉的对象、边界和认识论作用：对克里斯托弗-希尔的《知觉经验》的评论

Mind & Language Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI:10.1111/mila.12478

Zoe Jenkin

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摘要

克里斯托弗-希尔（Christopher Hill）在《知觉经验》一书中提出了一种以经验心理学为基础的表象心智理论。在此，我将重点讨论希尔图景的三个方面：视觉意识的对象、知觉/认知的边界以及知觉经验的认识论作用。我将介绍希尔的观点所面临的挑战，并考虑克服这些挑战的方法。

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Perception's objects, border, and epistemic role: Comments on Christopher Hill's Perceptual experience

Christopher Hill's book Perceptual experience argues for a representational theory of mind that is grounded in empirical psychology. I focus here on three aspects of Hill's picture: The objects of visual awareness, the perception/cognition border, and the epistemic role of perceptual experience. I introduce challenges to Hill's account and consider ways these challenges may be overcome.

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Mind & Language

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