基于区块链的去中心化奖励分享:矿池案例

IF 1.1 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Jens Gudmundsson, J. Hougaard
{"title":"基于区块链的去中心化奖励分享:矿池案例","authors":"Jens Gudmundsson, J. Hougaard","doi":"10.1145/3641120","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n We introduce a\n reciprocity protocol\n , an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains. Inherently decentralized and implementable, it puts emphasis on incentives rather than forcing specific sharing rules from the outset. Analyzing the non-cooperative game the protocol induces, we identify a robust, strict, and Pareto-dominant symmetric equilibrium. In it, even self-centered participants show extensive systemic reciprocity. Thus, despite a setting that is generally unfavorable to reciprocal behavior, the protocol enables users to build trust between themselves by taking on a role akin to a social contract.\n","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Blockchain-Based Decentralized Reward Sharing: The case of mining pools\",\"authors\":\"Jens Gudmundsson, J. Hougaard\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3641120\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n We introduce a\\n reciprocity protocol\\n , an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains. Inherently decentralized and implementable, it puts emphasis on incentives rather than forcing specific sharing rules from the outset. Analyzing the non-cooperative game the protocol induces, we identify a robust, strict, and Pareto-dominant symmetric equilibrium. In it, even self-centered participants show extensive systemic reciprocity. Thus, despite a setting that is generally unfavorable to reciprocal behavior, the protocol enables users to build trust between themselves by taking on a role akin to a social contract.\\n\",\"PeriodicalId\":42216,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3641120\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3641120","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

我们引入了互惠协议,这是一种在区块链中协调和分享奖励的创新方法。该协议本质上是去中心化和可实施的,它强调激励机制,而不是从一开始就强加特定的分享规则。通过分析该协议引发的非合作博弈,我们发现了一个稳健、严格和帕累托占优的对称均衡。在这个均衡中,即使是以自我为中心的参与者也会表现出广泛的系统互惠性。因此,尽管这种环境通常不利于互惠行为,但该协议却能让用户通过扮演类似于社会契约的角色来建立彼此之间的信任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Blockchain-Based Decentralized Reward Sharing: The case of mining pools
We introduce a reciprocity protocol , an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains. Inherently decentralized and implementable, it puts emphasis on incentives rather than forcing specific sharing rules from the outset. Analyzing the non-cooperative game the protocol induces, we identify a robust, strict, and Pareto-dominant symmetric equilibrium. In it, even self-centered participants show extensive systemic reciprocity. Thus, despite a setting that is generally unfavorable to reciprocal behavior, the protocol enables users to build trust between themselves by taking on a role akin to a social contract.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
期刊介绍: The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: Agents in networks Algorithmic game theory Computation of equilibria Computational social choice Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy") Design and analysis of electronic markets Economics of computational advertising Electronic commerce Learning in games and markets Mechanism design Paid search auctions Privacy Recommendation / reputation / trust systems Systems resilient against malicious agents.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信