{"title":"Pistis and Apodeixis:关于亚里士多德《修辞学》1.1,1355a5-6 的争议性解释","authors":"Jamie Dow","doi":"10.1163/1568525x-bja10218","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"‘We are convinced most of all whenever we take something to have been demonstrated’ (1355a5-6). The meaning and significance of this claim is a key point of dispute between those who take Aristotle’s project in the <jats:italic>Rhetoric</jats:italic> to be defending his distinctively argument-centred kind of rhetoric on the grounds that it is most persuasively effective, and those for whom he does so on the more normatively-charged grounds that this is the most valuable kind of rhetoric, and best delivers rhetoric’s distinctive benefits to civic communities. On the interpretation defended, the claim links being convinced (<jats:styled-content xml:lang=\"el-Grek\">πιστεύειν</jats:styled-content>) and the things that get us convinced (<jats:styled-content xml:lang=\"el-Grek\">πίστεις</jats:styled-content>) to the kind of epistemic merits possessed above all by demonstrations. This saves Aristotle from an implausible generalisation about the persuasive supremacy of deductive arguments. Since <jats:styled-content xml:lang=\"el-Grek\">πίστεις</jats:styled-content> are clearly central to Aristotelian rhetoric, this interpretation also lends support to the more normative understanding of Aristotle’s project overall.","PeriodicalId":46134,"journal":{"name":"MNEMOSYNE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Pistis and Apodeixis: On the Disputed Interpretation of Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.1, 1355a5-6\",\"authors\":\"Jamie Dow\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/1568525x-bja10218\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"‘We are convinced most of all whenever we take something to have been demonstrated’ (1355a5-6). The meaning and significance of this claim is a key point of dispute between those who take Aristotle’s project in the <jats:italic>Rhetoric</jats:italic> to be defending his distinctively argument-centred kind of rhetoric on the grounds that it is most persuasively effective, and those for whom he does so on the more normatively-charged grounds that this is the most valuable kind of rhetoric, and best delivers rhetoric’s distinctive benefits to civic communities. On the interpretation defended, the claim links being convinced (<jats:styled-content xml:lang=\\\"el-Grek\\\">πιστεύειν</jats:styled-content>) and the things that get us convinced (<jats:styled-content xml:lang=\\\"el-Grek\\\">πίστεις</jats:styled-content>) to the kind of epistemic merits possessed above all by demonstrations. This saves Aristotle from an implausible generalisation about the persuasive supremacy of deductive arguments. Since <jats:styled-content xml:lang=\\\"el-Grek\\\">πίστεις</jats:styled-content> are clearly central to Aristotelian rhetoric, this interpretation also lends support to the more normative understanding of Aristotle’s project overall.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46134,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"MNEMOSYNE\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"MNEMOSYNE\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/1568525x-bja10218\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"CLASSICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"MNEMOSYNE","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/1568525x-bja10218","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"CLASSICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Pistis and Apodeixis: On the Disputed Interpretation of Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.1, 1355a5-6
‘We are convinced most of all whenever we take something to have been demonstrated’ (1355a5-6). The meaning and significance of this claim is a key point of dispute between those who take Aristotle’s project in the Rhetoric to be defending his distinctively argument-centred kind of rhetoric on the grounds that it is most persuasively effective, and those for whom he does so on the more normatively-charged grounds that this is the most valuable kind of rhetoric, and best delivers rhetoric’s distinctive benefits to civic communities. On the interpretation defended, the claim links being convinced (πιστεύειν) and the things that get us convinced (πίστεις) to the kind of epistemic merits possessed above all by demonstrations. This saves Aristotle from an implausible generalisation about the persuasive supremacy of deductive arguments. Since πίστεις are clearly central to Aristotelian rhetoric, this interpretation also lends support to the more normative understanding of Aristotle’s project overall.
期刊介绍:
Since its first appearance as a journal of textual criticism in 1852, Mnemosyne has secured a position as one of the leading journals in its field worldwide. Its reputation is built on the Dutch academic tradition, famous for its rigour and thoroughness. It attracts contributions from all over the world, with the result that Mnemosyne is distinctive for a combination of scholarly approaches from both sides of the Atlantic and the Equator. Its presence in libraries around the globe is a sign of its continued reputation as an invaluable resource for scholarship in Classical studies.