Mackenzie M. Festa, D. K. Holderness, Megan M. Jones, Richard A. Riley
{"title":"审计重要性披露对举报意向的意外后果","authors":"Mackenzie M. Festa, D. K. Holderness, Megan M. Jones, Richard A. Riley","doi":"10.2308/horizons-2022-198","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Within the accounting profession, there exists disagreement about the merits of disclosing auditors’ materiality thresholds. Professional standards require materiality threshold disclosures in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands but not in the United States. Additionally, some audit firms, like PwC-Finland and PwC-Sweden, elect to disclose materiality voluntarily. Although disclosing materiality has been shown to benefit investor decision-making, prior research also suggests that client personnel may take advantage of the information to engage in earnings manipulations below the materiality threshold. We contribute to this debate by examining the influence of materiality disclosures on employee whistleblowing intentions. We conduct an experiment wherein we manipulate materiality threshold disclosure (absent or present) and earnings manipulation amount (above or below materiality). We find evidence that the disclosure of the materiality threshold significantly decreases whistleblowing intentions when earnings manipulation falls below materiality and has no effect on whistleblowing intentions for above-materiality earnings manipulation.\n Data Availability: The data are available from the authors.","PeriodicalId":51419,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Horizons","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Unintended Consequences of Audit Materiality Disclosures on Whistleblowing Intentions\",\"authors\":\"Mackenzie M. Festa, D. K. Holderness, Megan M. Jones, Richard A. Riley\",\"doi\":\"10.2308/horizons-2022-198\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Within the accounting profession, there exists disagreement about the merits of disclosing auditors’ materiality thresholds. Professional standards require materiality threshold disclosures in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands but not in the United States. Additionally, some audit firms, like PwC-Finland and PwC-Sweden, elect to disclose materiality voluntarily. Although disclosing materiality has been shown to benefit investor decision-making, prior research also suggests that client personnel may take advantage of the information to engage in earnings manipulations below the materiality threshold. We contribute to this debate by examining the influence of materiality disclosures on employee whistleblowing intentions. We conduct an experiment wherein we manipulate materiality threshold disclosure (absent or present) and earnings manipulation amount (above or below materiality). We find evidence that the disclosure of the materiality threshold significantly decreases whistleblowing intentions when earnings manipulation falls below materiality and has no effect on whistleblowing intentions for above-materiality earnings manipulation.\\n Data Availability: The data are available from the authors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51419,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Accounting Horizons\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Accounting Horizons\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2308/horizons-2022-198\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Accounting Horizons","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2308/horizons-2022-198","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Unintended Consequences of Audit Materiality Disclosures on Whistleblowing Intentions
Within the accounting profession, there exists disagreement about the merits of disclosing auditors’ materiality thresholds. Professional standards require materiality threshold disclosures in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands but not in the United States. Additionally, some audit firms, like PwC-Finland and PwC-Sweden, elect to disclose materiality voluntarily. Although disclosing materiality has been shown to benefit investor decision-making, prior research also suggests that client personnel may take advantage of the information to engage in earnings manipulations below the materiality threshold. We contribute to this debate by examining the influence of materiality disclosures on employee whistleblowing intentions. We conduct an experiment wherein we manipulate materiality threshold disclosure (absent or present) and earnings manipulation amount (above or below materiality). We find evidence that the disclosure of the materiality threshold significantly decreases whistleblowing intentions when earnings manipulation falls below materiality and has no effect on whistleblowing intentions for above-materiality earnings manipulation.
Data Availability: The data are available from the authors.
期刊介绍:
Accounting Horizons is one of three association-wide journals published by the American Accounting Association AAA. This journal seeks to bridge academic and professional audiences with articles that focus on accounting, broadly defined, and that provide insights pertinent to the accounting profession. The contents of Accounting Horizons, therefore, should interest researchers, educators, practitioners, regulators, and students of accounting.