金融债务契约和管理机构问题

IF 2.9 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Financial Management Pub Date : 2024-01-15 DOI:10.1111/fima.12444

Björn Imbierowicz, Daniel Streitz

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了贷款人在贷款合同中是否利用清偿契约解决管理代理问题。清偿要求在触发时进行（部分）提前还款，许多合同中都包含清偿条款。利用经纪公司合并和倒闭导致的分析师覆盖率下降这一外生因素，我们发现借款人不透明性的增加会显著增加扫尾条款的使用。如果借款人的管理水平较高，而且贷款人同时持有公司的债务和股权，则这种效应最强。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，贷款人实施清偿契约的目的是通过限制财富被侵占的可能性来缓解管理代理问题。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Financial debt contracting and managerial agency problems

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Financial debt contracting and managerial agency problems

This paper analyzes if lenders resolve managerial agency problems in loan contracts using sweep covenants. Sweeps require a (partial) prepayment when triggered and are included in many contracts. Exploiting exogenous reductions in analyst coverage due to brokerage house mergers and closures, we find that increased borrower opacity significantly increases sweep use. The effect is strongest for borrowers with higher levels of managerial entrenchment and if lenders hold both debt and equity in the firm. Overall, our results suggest that lenders implement sweep covenants to mitigate managerial agency problems by limiting contingencies of wealth expropriation.

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来源期刊

Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

6.00

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Financial Management (FM) serves both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, and public or private not-for-profit organizations.