基于批发价格歧视和销售努力的双渠道供应链纳什均衡研究

IF 1.3 4区 数学 Q3 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Jin Sha, Sisi Zheng
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引用次数: 0

摘要

通信技术和互联网的进步使得双渠道供应链有了长足的发展。供应链成员为了获得更大的自身利益,不得不与链上其他企业展开竞争与合作。在企业间的竞争合作关系中,价格歧视和销售努力是常用的操作手段,纳什均衡理论是供应链博弈过程中常用的策略。制造商能否通过价格歧视促进零售商实施销售努力,确保在纳什均衡时提高供应链的整体收益,对供应链和单个企业都具有重要意义。本文构建了一个由独立制造商、线下零售商和线上零售商组成的分散双渠道供应链数学模型,考虑了线下零售商的销售努力对其需求的影响及其对另一渠道的正外部性。在制造商对不同零售商收取不同批发价的条件下,建立了零售商决定是否支付销售努力的收益矩阵,并利用纳什均衡博弈论求解了每个决策组合成为纳什均衡的条件。最后,分析了制造商的最优定价策略,以获得当制造商采用批发价格歧视策略时,该双渠道供应链实现帕累托改进的约束条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Research on Nash Equilibrium of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Based on Wholesale Price Discrimination and Sales Efforts
The progress of communication technology and the Internet has made the dual-channel supply chain have great development. Supply chain members have to compete and cooperate with other enterprises on the chain in order to obtain greater self-benefit. In the competitive-cooperative relationship among enterprises, price discrimination and sales effort are common tools of operation, and Nash equilibrium theory is a common strategy in the process of supply chain game. Whether manufacturers can promote retailers to implement sales efforts through price discrimination and ensure that the overall revenue of the supply chain is improved at the Nash equilibrium is great significance to both the supply chain and individual enterprises. This paper constructs a decentralized dual-channel supply chain mathematical model composed of an independent manufacturer, an offline retailer, and an online retailer, taking into account the impact of the offline retailer’s sales efforts on his demand and its positive external for the other channel. The revenue matrix of retailers’ decisions about whether or not to pay their sales efforts is built under the condition that manufacturers charge different wholesale prices to different retailers and solves the condition of every decision combination becoming the Nash equilibrium using the Nash equilibrium game theory. Finally, the optimal pricing strategy of the manufacturers is analysed to get the constraints of this dual-channel supply chain achieving Pareto improvement when manufacturer uses wholesale price discrimination strategy.
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来源期刊
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 综合性期刊-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
598
审稿时长
3 months
期刊介绍: The main objective of Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society is to foster links between basic and applied research relating to discrete dynamics of complex systems encountered in the natural and social sciences. The journal intends to stimulate publications directed to the analyses of computer generated solutions and chaotic in particular, correctness of numerical procedures, chaos synchronization and control, discrete optimization methods among other related topics. The journal provides a channel of communication between scientists and practitioners working in the field of complex systems analysis and will stimulate the development and use of discrete dynamical approach.
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