Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
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Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an item in her desired set. Unlike most online matching settings, where agents arrive online, in our setting the items arrive one by one in an adversarial order while the buyers are present for the entire duration of the process. This poses a significant challenge to the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the ability of buyers to strategize over future rounds. We provide an almost full picture of the competitive ratios in different scenarios, including myopic vs. non-myopic agents, tardy vs. prompt payments, and private vs. public desired sets. Among other results, we identify the frontier up to which the celebrated \(e/(e-1)\) competitive ratio for the vertex-weighted online matching of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani extends to truthful agents and online items.
期刊介绍：
Algorithmica is an international journal which publishes theoretical papers on algorithms that address problems arising in practical areas, and experimental papers of general appeal for practical importance or techniques. The development of algorithms is an integral part of computer science. The increasing complexity and scope of computer applications makes the design of efficient algorithms essential.
Algorithmica covers algorithms in applied areas such as: VLSI, distributed computing, parallel processing, automated design, robotics, graphics, data base design, software tools, as well as algorithms in fundamental areas such as sorting, searching, data structures, computational geometry, and linear programming.
In addition, the journal features two special sections: Application Experience, presenting findings obtained from applications of theoretical results to practical situations, and Problems, offering short papers presenting problems on selected topics of computer science.
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