操纵性过度自信和不带偏见报道的代价

IF 2 4区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我在一个委托-代理模型中研究收益管理,在该模型中,代理人对其管理收益的能力过于自信,委托人可能会诱使代理人如实告知收益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Manipulative overconfidence and the cost of unbiased reporting
I study earnings management in a principal-agent model where the agent is overconfident in their ability to manage earnings, and the principal may induce the agent to communicate earnings truthfull...
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
11.80%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Accounting and Business Research publishes papers containing a substantial and original contribution to knowledge. Papers may cover any area of accounting, broadly defined and including corporate governance, auditing and taxation. However the focus must be accounting, rather than (corporate) finance or general management. Authors may take a theoretical or an empirical approach, using either quantitative or qualitative methods. They may aim to contribute to developing and understanding the role of accounting in business. Papers should be rigorous but also written in a way that makes them intelligible to a wide range of academics and, where appropriate, practitioners.
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