技术合作还是竞争?信息和通信技术市场中在位者和进入者的最优战略

IF 6.7 2区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT
Yifan Liu , Minqiang Li , Haiyang Feng , Nan Feng
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了信息和通信技术(ICT)市场中在位企业与新进入企业之间的技术合作或技术竞争模式。在信息和通信技术市场中,在位企业通常会将其关键技术许可给新进入企业,而新进入企业通常是在位企业的竞争对手,可以选择通过技术许可提前进入市场(即技术合作),或通过内部研发生产更高质量的产品推迟进入市场(即技术竞争)。利用博弈论模型,我们发现当技术转让率和进入者的研发能力处于中间状态时,技术合作是一种均衡战略;而当技术转让率高而进入者的研发能力低,或当技术转让率低而进入者的研发能力高时,两家公司就会展开技术竞争。我们还发现,高特许权使用费和价格竞争的缓和会激励企业进行技术合作,而当特许权使用费较低时,或当特许权使用费较高而价格竞争激烈时,企业则会参与技术竞争。此外,企业形成技术合作的动机与进入者内部研发阶段的长度呈非单调变化,只有当内部研发阶段处于中等长度时,才会达成技术合作。从社会角度看,无论是相当高的技术转移率还是较低的技术转移率,都能确保在技术合作下获得更高的社会福利,在一定条件下,技术合作会带来在位者、进入者和消费者的三赢结果。此外,当企业内部研发(in-house R&D)条件下新进入者的市场进入时机由内生决定时,技术合作不太可能成为一种均衡战略。我们的研究结果可以解释在位者和新进入者的技术合作或竞争战略,并为相互竞争的 ICT 企业和政策制定者提供管理启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Technological cooperation or competition? optimal strategies of incumbent and entrant in ICT markets

This study examines the patterns of technological cooperation or technological competition between an incumbent firm and an entrant firm in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) markets. The incumbent firm in ICT markets often licenses its key technology to a new entrant, who is usually the rival to the incumbent and has the option to enter the market early through licensing in the technology (i.e., technological cooperation), or to delay its entry for producing a higher quality product through in-house R&D (i.e., technological competition). Using a game-theoretical model, we find that technological cooperation is an equilibrium strategy when the technology transfer rate and entrant's R&D capacity are intermediate; while two firms engage in technological competition when the technology transfer rate is high and the entrant's R&D capacity is low, or when the technology transfer rate is low and the entrant's R&D capacity is high. We also find that the high royalty rate and mitigated price competition incentivize technological cooperation, while firms engage in technological competition when the royalty rate is low, or when the royalty rate is high and the price competition is intense. In addition, the incentives for firms to form technological cooperation vary non-monotonically with the length of the entrant's in-house R&D phase, and technological cooperation is reached only when the in-house R&D phase is of medium length. From a social perspective, both fairly high and low technology transfer rates ensure higher social welfare under technological cooperation, which under certain conditions can lead to a win-win-win outcome for the incumbent, entrant, and consumers. Furthermore, technological cooperation is less likely to be an equilibrium strategy when the entrant's market entry timing under in-house R&D is endogenously determined. Our findings can explain the observations of the incumbent and entrant's technological cooperation or competition strategies and provide managerial implications for competing ICT firms and policymakers.

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来源期刊
Omega-international Journal of Management Science
Omega-international Journal of Management Science 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
13.80
自引率
11.60%
发文量
130
审稿时长
56 days
期刊介绍: Omega reports on developments in management, including the latest research results and applications. Original contributions and review articles describe the state of the art in specific fields or functions of management, while there are shorter critical assessments of particular management techniques. Other features of the journal are the "Memoranda" section for short communications and "Feedback", a correspondence column. Omega is both stimulating reading and an important source for practising managers, specialists in management services, operational research workers and management scientists, management consultants, academics, students and research personnel throughout the world. The material published is of high quality and relevance, written in a manner which makes it accessible to all of this wide-ranging readership. Preference will be given to papers with implications to the practice of management. Submissions of purely theoretical papers are discouraged. The review of material for publication in the journal reflects this aim.
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