结果合理化:竞争市场中相互依存的学习

IF 2.9 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Anoop Menon, Dennis Yao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我们使用模拟模型来探讨竞争市场中的相互依赖学习。这种互动既需要关注焦点企业管理层所持有的心理表征,也需要关注该管理层对竞争对手管理层所持有的表征的信念。当共同决定的结果成为学习过程的主要输入时,理解对手的信念--我们称之为战略同理心--就成为推动绩效的关键因素。为了说明这些过程,我们将重点放在管理者对市场需求的心理表征上。在我们的模拟模型中,学习是通过市场观察发生的,市场观察会重新调整经理对需求的表征。但是,这种重新校准所允许的灵活性也是管理者合理化错误表征的一种方式。我们发现,这些过程有时会导致最初正确的表述失真,并可能导致管理者持有较少正确表述的公司取得较好的相对业绩。最后,我们探讨了对竞争对手需求表征的深入了解如何通过有意塑造竞争对手学习方式的市场行为来提高自身绩效。补充材料:在线附录见 https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2018.0083 。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rationalizing Outcomes: Interdependent Learning in Competitive Markets
In this article, we use simulation models to explore interdependent learning in competitive markets. Such interactions require attention to both the mental representations held by the management of the focal firm as well as the beliefs of that management about the representations held by rival management. When jointly determined outcomes are the primary input to the learning process, understanding rival beliefs—what we call strategic empathy—becomes a crucial factor driving performance. To illustrate these processes, we focus on mental representations that a manager has regarding market demand. In our simulation models, learning occurs through market observations, which recalibrate a manager’s representation about demand. But the flexibility allowed by this recalibration is also a way through which managers rationalize incorrect representations. We find these processes sometimes lead to distortions of initially correct representations and may result in superior relative performance by the firm whose manager holds less correct representations. Finally, we explore how superior knowledge of a rival’s demand representations can improve own performance through market actions that intentionally shape how a rival learns. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2018.0083 .
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来源期刊
Strategy Science
Strategy Science MANAGEMENT-
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
5.10%
发文量
31
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