Cognition and Proof in Criminal Proceedings: Problems of the Correlation of Concepts

The author examines an issue that is still debatable in the science of criminal procedure law — the correlation between the concepts of «cognition» and «criminal procedural proof». There is no unity of views among scholars regarding this point. The goal of the research is the critical assessment of arguments presented by those researchers who equate cognition and criminal procedure proof, as well as the presentation of reasons proving that these concepts are in a generic-specific relation. The author also argues for the necessity of differentiating between such concepts as cognition, cognition in a criminal case, criminal procedural cognition and proof, and presents her own opinion regarding their content and correlation. The author used the general scientific methods of theoretical analysis, synthesis, formal logic legal interpretation, generalization and systematization of research data. The logical analysis identified some drawbacks and contradictions in the argumentation of scholars regarding the issues discussed in the article. It is concluded that criminal procedural cognition, and such its important part as proof, is a particular, specific type of cognition which cannot but demonstrate regularities common for any cognition. Besides, cognition is impossible without proof, but not vice versa. Disagreeing with the scholars who understand proving only as an activity carried out by the proceedings’ participants in order to justify conclusions, the author states that cognition and justification are two aspects of proof in the criminal proceedings. According to the legislative definition of proving it should be understood as the process of obtaining criminal procedural evidence and using it as arguments to substantiate the presence or absence of circumstances enumerated in Art. 74 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.