{"title":"滚动录取下的动态决策：来自美国法学院申请的证据","authors":"Yao Luo, Y. Wang","doi":"10.1086/724499","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Admission processes in many higher-education markets are inherently dynamic. We study the timing of students’ applications and schools’ admissions under rolling admissions using unique data on US law schools. Our results show that law schools employ nonstationary admission standards within application cycles: applications submitted earlier enjoy a considerable advantage relative to later applications.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"120 1","pages":"433 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Dynamic Decision-Making under Rolling Admissions: Evidence from US Law School Applications\",\"authors\":\"Yao Luo, Y. Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/724499\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Admission processes in many higher-education markets are inherently dynamic. We study the timing of students’ applications and schools’ admissions under rolling admissions using unique data on US law schools. Our results show that law schools employ nonstationary admission standards within application cycles: applications submitted earlier enjoy a considerable advantage relative to later applications.\",\"PeriodicalId\":22657,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Journal of Law and Economics\",\"volume\":\"120 1\",\"pages\":\"433 - 463\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Journal of Law and Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1086/724499\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Journal of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724499","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Dynamic Decision-Making under Rolling Admissions: Evidence from US Law School Applications
Admission processes in many higher-education markets are inherently dynamic. We study the timing of students’ applications and schools’ admissions under rolling admissions using unique data on US law schools. Our results show that law schools employ nonstationary admission standards within application cycles: applications submitted earlier enjoy a considerable advantage relative to later applications.
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