土地保有权和成本效率低下:智利水稻(Oryza sativa L.)种植案例

Ricardo Andrés Troncoso Sepúlveda, Juan Hernán Cabas Monje, B. Guesmi
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摘要

本研究旨在以智利尼布勒大区的水稻种植农户为样本,考察土地保有权安排对生产成本的影响。在 2014-2015 年对 107 位农民的面板调查中,使用基元方法估算了随机前沿模型。生产成本分为前沿成本和低效率成本。研究结果表明,经济低效使水稻生产成本提高了 82%。技术效率低下导致成本增加 61%,分配效率低下导致成本增加 21%。在所有保有权类型中,土地是分配不当程度最高的投入,占分配低效成本的 93%。佃农制是分配投入效率最高的一种安排,与租赁制和所有制相比,其生产成本差异显著。这一研究结果表明,在制定引导土地权属制度的政策之前,有必要对具体情况进行评估,因为严格来说,没有哪种制度比另一种制度更优越。亮点: 经济效率低下使水稻生产成本提高了 82%。技术效率低下导致成本增加 61%,分配效率低下导致成本增加 21%。佃农制度效率最高,生产成本比租赁制度低 13.5%,比所有制低 3.4%。佃农有更大的动力付出更多的努力,更高效地完成所有责任,这可以减少或消除雇佣劳动制度中典型的与监督有关的成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Land tenure and cost inefficiency: the case of rice (Oryza sativa L.) cultivation in Chile
This study aims to examine the impact of land tenure arrangements on production costs in a sample of rice farmers in Ñuble Region, Chile. A stochastic frontier model was estimated using the primal approach on a panel of 107 farmers in 2014-2015. Production cost was broken down into frontier costs and inefficiency. According to findings, economic inefficiency raises rice production costs by 82%. Technical inefficiency accounts for a 61% increase, while allocative inefficiency accounts for 21%. Across tenure types, land is the input with the highest misallocation, accounting for 93% of allocative inefficiency costs. Sharecropping is the arrangement allocating inputs most efficiently, producing significant differences in production costs relative to leasing and ownership. This finding suggests that before designing a policy to induce a tenure system, it is necessary to evaluate specific cases as there is no system superior to another, strictly speaking. Highlights: Economic inefficiency raises rice production costs by 82%. Technical inefficiency accounts for a 61% increase, while allocative inefficiency accounts for 21%. The sharecropping system stood out as the most efficient, with production costs 13.5% lower than the rental system and 3.4% lower than those of the ownership system. Sharecroppers have a higher incentive to exert more effort and complete all responsibilities more efficiently, which can cut down on or do away with the costs associated with supervision that are typical in wage labor systems.
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