关于聊天机器人的虚构

Fintan Mallory
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引用次数: 0

摘要

根据元语义学中广为接受的观点,聊天机器人和其他人工文本生成器的输出应该是无意义的。它们并非出于交流意图而生成,生成它们的系统也没有遵循语言惯例。然而,聊天机器人已经在客户服务和医疗保健领域发挥了作用,它们正在传播信息和虚假信息,而且在某些情况下,相信机器人的输出结果可能比我们人类的输出结果更合理。为了解释聊天机器人在社会中的认识论作用,我们需要协调这些观察结果。本文认为,我们与聊天机器人的接触应被理解为一种以道具为导向的虚构;聊天机器人的输出在字面上是无意义的,但在虚构上是有意义的。通过 "虚构 "的方法,我们可以理解聊天机器人如何通过准证词为我们提供世界知识,同时保留我们的元语义理论。这种说法还有助于将聊天机器人研究与科学工具的认识论联系起来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fictionalism about Chatbots
According to widely accepted views in metasemantics, the outputs of chatbots and other artificial text generators should be meaningless. They aren’t produced with communicative intentions and the systems producing them are not following linguistic conventions. Nevertheless, chatbots have assumed roles in customer service and healthcare, they are spreading information and disinformation and, in some cases, it may be more rational to trust the outputs of bots than those of our fellow human beings. To account for the epistemic role of chatbots in our society, we need to reconcile these observations. This paper argues that our engagement with chatbots should be understood as a form of prop-oriented make-believe; the outputs of chatbots are literally meaningless but fictionally meaningful. With the make-believe approach, we can understand how chatbots can provide us with knowledge of the world through quasi-testimony while preserving our metasemantic theories. This account also helps to connect the study of chatbots with the epistemology of scientific instruments.
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