语境中的集体交流意图

Andrew Peet
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引用次数: 0

摘要

说话者的意义对象是什么?传统的答案是:命题。传统的答案面临着一个重要的挑战:如果命题是说话者意义的对象,那么说话者必须有具体的命题来让听众理解。然而,说话者通常对他们如何被解释表现出一定程度的漠不关心,不可能理性地打算让听众恢复特定的命题。因此,命题并不是说话者意义的对象(布坎南,2010;麦克法兰,2020a;2020b;以及阿布鲁-扎瓦雷塔,2021)。在本文中,我做了两件事。首先,我概述了这一挑战的集体类比,它削弱了对原始挑战最突出的回应。其次,我提供了一个新的解决方案:典型语篇由一组部分交际意图支持。这一对策解决了问题的个体和集体变体,并使我们得以保留对说话者意义的传统命题观点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Collective Communicative Intentions in Context
What are the objects of speaker meaning? The traditional answer is: propositions. The traditional answer faces an important challenge: if propositions are the objects of speaker meaning then there must be specific propositions that speakers intend their audiences to recover. Yet, speakers typically exhibit a degree of indifference regarding how they are interpreted, and cannot rationally intend for their audiences to recover specific propositions. Therefore, propositions are not the objects of speaker meaning (Buchanan 2010; MacFarlane 2020a; 2020b; and Abreu Zavaleta 2021). In this paper I do two things. Firstly, I outline a collective analogue of this challenge that undermines the most prominent responses to the original challenge. Secondly, I provide a new solution: typical utterances are backed by a cluster of partial communicative intentions. This response resolves both individual and collective variants of the problem and allows us to retain the traditional propositional view of speaker meaning.
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