政府管理下共享停车市场推广的进化博弈分析

IF 2.7 4区 工程技术 Q2 TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Qingqi Wei, Guomei Xiao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

城市环境中的供需失衡严重阻碍了城市交通的可持续发展。共享停车是缓解这些挑战的可行解决方案。然而,要实现共享停车的持续发展,政府的监管机制势在必行。为了促进共享停车市场的推广,我们构建了一个包含政府、企业和停车需求者的演化博弈模型。该模型探讨了这些利益相关者的稳定策略,并确定了不同参数条件下的多种均衡状态。结果表明,这些演化策略的速率和稳定性受到三方共同利益的制约。此外,这些利益相关者参与共享停车的意愿也会在不同程度上相互影响。政府补贴是企业和需求者战略选择的决定性因素,尽管演变速度不同。时间价值较高的需求者会表现出对路边停车位的偏好,从而影响企业的战略。为了促进共享停车市场的长期发展,政府必须制定适当的补贴政策,保持法规的一致性,并倡导增加对停车需求者的补贴,以减少时间异质性对停车行为选择的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Evolutionary game analysis of the shared parking market promotion under government management
The imbalance between supply and demand in urban settings poses a significant barrier to the sustainable advancement of urban transportation. Shared parking serves as a viable solution to mitigate these challenges. Nevertheless, for its sustained growth, a regulatory mechanism enforced by the government is imperative. To promote shared parking market diffusion, we construct an evolutionary game model that incorporates the government, enterprises, and parking demanders. It explores stabilisation strategies for these stakeholders and identifies multiple equilibrium states under different parameter conditions. The results show that the rate and stability of these evolutionary strategies are constrained by the mutual benefits derived by the three parties. Furthermore, such stakeholders are reciprocally influenced by their willingness to engage in shared parking to varying degrees. Government subsidies serve as a determining factor for the strategic choices made by both enterprises and demanders, albeit at different evolutionary rates. Demanders who place a higher value of time demonstrate a preference for on-street parking, thereby influencing enterprise strategies. To foster the long-term growth of the shared parking market, the government must enact appropriate subsidy policies, maintain consistent regulations, and advocate for increased subsidies for parking demanders to reduce the effect of temporal heterogeneity on parking behavioural choices.
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来源期刊
Transportation Safety and Environment
Transportation Safety and Environment TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY-
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
13.60%
发文量
32
审稿时长
10 weeks
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