The Essence of Consciousness Eludes Psychology as a Science of the Palpable

Historians of psychology are aware that, at its beginning, psychology had a choice with respect to the type of science it was going to be. It could be a content type psychology using the experimental method as proposed by Wundt or a basic empirical psychology founded on acts of consciousness explicated through critical analyses and careful descriptions of psychological phenomena as proposed by Brentano. As noted by Boring, because content was palpable and acts seemed elusive, Wundt’s experimental psychology prevailed. But Watson believed that, as they were themselves still difficult to detect, the content of conscious processes were not sufficiently palpable. So, he advocated using behavior as the basis for experimental psychology. Yet palpability is essential for the experimental method, not for studying consciousness. Intentionality is the essence of consciousness, but it is not palpable, though detectable. In the teens and twenties of the 19th Century some German psychologists developed a type of bipartite psychology that included both acts and content, but their work remained isolated.