共享生产环境下设备供应商的销售和共享决策研究

Wenbo Li, Bin Dan, Xumei Zhang, Yi Liu, Ronghua Sui
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摘要

目的随着制造业共享经济的快速发展,制造商和设备供应商经常通过第三方平台共享产能。本文旨在研究制造商共享产能对供应商的影响,并分析供应商是否共享产能及其影响因素。设计/方法/途径本文研究的条件是供应商和制造商通过第三方平台共享产能,第三方平台与供应商在设备销售方面展开竞争。考虑到制造商单位产能使用收益的异质性和制造商使用策略的生产效率,本文构建了产能共享博弈模型。研究结果表明,当生产成本或维护成本较高时,制造商共享产能同时有利于供应商、第三方平台和单位产能使用收益较高的制造商。当租赁效率和生产成本都较低或租赁效率和生产成本都较高时,供应商同时出售设备和共享产能。在其他情况下,供应商只出售设备。当租赁效率和生产成本都较低时,供应商共享产能实现了供应商、第三方平台和制造商的三赢局面,单位产能使用收益适中。它拓展了产能共享的研究领域,对供应商的运营决策具有重要意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Research on sales and sharing decisions of the equipment supplier under shared manufacturing environment
PurposeWith the rapid development of the sharing economy in manufacturing industries, manufacturers and the equipment suppliers frequently share capacity through the third-party platform. This paper aims to study influences of manufacturers sharing capacity on the supplier and to analyze whether the supplier shares capacity as well as its influences.Design/methodology/approachThis paper deals with conditions that the supplier and manufacturers share capacity through the third-party platform, and the third-party platform competes with the supplier in equipment sales. Considering the heterogeneity of the manufacturer's earning of unit capacity usage and the production efficiency of manufacturer's usage strategies, this paper constructs capacity sharing game models. Then, model equilibrium results under different sharing scenarios are compared.FindingsThe results show that when the production or maintenance cost is high, manufacturers sharing capacity simultaneously benefits the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with high earnings of unit capacity usage. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, or both the rental efficiency and the production cost are high, the supplier simultaneously sells equipment and shares capacity. The supplier only sells equipment in other cases. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, the supplier’s sharing capacity realizes the win-win-win situation for the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with moderate earnings of unit capacity usage.Originality/valueThis paper innovatively examines supplier's selling and sharing decisions considering manufacturers sharing capacity. It extends the research on capacity sharing and is important to supplier's operational decisions.
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