从议价角度看纵向一体化

IF 1.3 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique Pub Date : 2023-12-24 DOI:10.1111/caje.12700

Hendrik Döpper, Geza Sapi, Christian Wey

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了在投入品市场存在讨价还价的双边双头垄断行业中的纵向一体化激励机制。纵向一体化激励是上下游横向一体化激励的组合，取决于可替代性和互补性的强弱以及单位成本函数的形状。在特定情况下，纵向一体化比横向兼并更能为兼并后的实体带来垄断议价能力。在针对外生确定的目标企业的竞标博弈中，纵向兼并可以支配横向兼并，而抢先收购不会发生。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

A bargaining perspective on vertical integration

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A bargaining perspective on vertical integration

We analyze vertical integration incentives in a bilaterally duopolistic industry with bargaining in the input market. Vertical integration incentives are a combination of horizontal integration incentives upstream and downstream and depend on the strength of substitutability and complementarity and the shape of the unit cost function. Under particular circumstances, vertical integration can convey more bargaining power to the merged entity than a horizontal merger to monopoly. In a bidding game for an exogenously determined target firm, a vertical merger can dominate a horizontal one, while pre-emption does not occur.

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来源期刊

Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.20

自引率

6.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Canadian Journal of Economics (CJE) is the journal of the Canadian Economics Association (CEA) and is the primary academic economics journal based in Canada. The editors seek to maintain and enhance the position of the CJE as a major, internationally recognized journal and are very receptive to high-quality papers on any economics topic from any source. In addition, the editors recognize the Journal"s role as an important outlet for high-quality empirical papers about the Canadian economy and about Canadian policy issues.