从公共部门代理冲突的角度看社会控制

Q4 Decision Sciences
Hugo Leonardo Menezes De Carvalho, Rodrigo Silva Diniz Leroy
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引用次数: 0

摘要

目的:这项工作的总体目标是分析透明度作为一种社会控制手段,如何成为代理冲突的缓解因素。 理论背景:本研究基于这样一个理论假设,即社会控制越强,表明社会对公共管理者的控制程度越高,从而减少代理冲突。为了验证这一假设,将把 "透明度 "作为控制手段之一进行分析,因为在社会控制较强的情况下,管理者往往更加透明,社会环境也更好。 分析方法:采用定量方法,将联邦公共事务部的透明度指数(IT)与其他社会数据,如各州的社会经济指标(人类发展指数(HDI)、人均收入指数(RPC)和基尼系数(GINI))以及各州针对公共管理部门的警方调查数量进行相关分析。 结果和结论:可以注意到,所分析的透明度指数与财富和社会经济发展指标显著相关,且呈正相关,这可能表明较发达和较富裕的地区往往更加透明。 研究意义:本研究推动了对公共部门中存在的社会控制因素和代理冲突的验证,而在以往的国内文献中,对这一事实的探讨仍然很少。 原创性/价值:社会对其代表的行为缺乏控制,最终导致在有效解决公共部门中存在的代理冲突方面控制不力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Social Control From the Perspective of Agency Conflict in the Public Sector
Purpose: This work has the general objective of analyzing how transparency, as an instrument of social control, can act as a mitigating element of agency conflict.   Theoretical Background: The present study is based on the theoretical assumption that the presence of greater social control reveals a greater level of society's control over public managers, reducing agency conflicts. To validate this assumption, Transparency will be analyzed as one of the control instruments, since, in a scenario of greater social control, managers tend to be more transparent and there is a better social environment.   Methodology: A quantitative methodology was used with correlation between the Transparency Index (IT), carried out by the Federal Public Ministry, with other social data, such as the socioeconomic indicators of the States (Human Development Index – HDI, Per Capita Income – RPC and Gini Index -GINI) and the number of police investigations against public administration opened in the States.   Results and Conclusion: It was possible to note that the Transparency Index analyzed is significantly correlated, with a positive sign, to the indicators of wealth and socioeconomic development, signaling possible evidence that more developed and richer locations tend to be more transparent.   Research Implications: The study advances in the verification of social control factors and the agency conflict that exists in the public sector, a fact still little explored in previous national literature.   Originality/Value: The lack of social control over the actions of its representatives ends up contributing to weak control in the effective solution of the agency conflict that exists in the public sector.
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来源期刊
International Journal of Professional Business Review
International Journal of Professional Business Review Business, Management and Accounting-Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
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16
审稿时长
3 weeks
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