Dynamic Analysis of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Heterogeneous Players and a Delay Decision

This paper considers a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer who wholesales new products through the traditional retail channel and distributes remanufactured products via a direct (online) channel established by himself. Two dynamical Stackelberg game models are developed based on the assumption that the retailer is an adaptive player, and the manufacturer is a bounded rational player who may adopt a delay decision. The existence and locally asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium are examined. Moreover, the impacts of key parameters on the complexity characteristics of the models and the performance of chain members are studied by numerical simulation. The results reveal that the excessively fast price adjustment speeds of the manufacturer, the larger consumers’ discount perception for the remanufactured products, and the consumers’ preference for the direct channel have a strong destabilizing effect on the Nash equilibrium’s stability. Furthermore, the delay decision implemented by the manufacturer could be a stabilizing or destabilizing factor for the system. The manufacturer will tolerate a considerable profit reduction while the retailer gains more profits when the dual-channel CLSC system enters periodic cycles and chaotic motions.