Descartes’ cogito as a basis of the phenomenological realizing of a consciousness

The article is devoted to the Cartesian cogito as a basic concept of the phenomenological approach to consciousness. The author aims to develop the thesis about the importance of the Cartesian cogito in the context of the possibility of the unconscious in phenomenological psychology. The solid foundation of Cartesian "universal mathematics" is consciousness, purified from sensual components, access to which is achieved through the methodical procedure of doubt. In the author's opinion, R. Descartes' influence on E. Husserl regarding the concept of consciousness was exercised through F. Brentano, and the author provides a refutation of F. Brentano's possibility of the existence of the unconscious. In this aspect, the problem of the correlation between consciousness and psyche, as well as the issue of the unconscious in the phenomenological tradition is considered. The author concludes that the unconscious cannot act as an ontological level of the unconscious psyche.