动态优惠贸易协定的形成与政治经济学的作用

IF 1.7 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI:10.1111/ecin.13199

Eric Conglin Chi, Halis Murat Yildiz

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引用次数: 0

摘要

通过使用动态优惠贸易协定（PTA）形成模型，我们发现出口和进口竞争部门的政治偏差会对优惠贸易协定的形成产生重大影响。在自由贸易协定（FTA）博弈中，排他性和搭便车动机都会限制全球自由贸易的扩展，而在关税同盟（CU）博弈中，只有前者才会产生排他性和搭便车动机。当我们在自由贸易协定和关税同盟之间进行内生选择时，自由贸易协定的灵活性优势和关税同盟的协调优势之间的矛盾表明，自由贸易协定始终是建立自由贸易协定的基石，而关税同盟则可能是建立自由贸易协定的绊脚石。

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Dynamic preferential trade agreement formation and the role of political economy

Using a dynamic preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model, we show that political biases in exporting and import-competing sectors substantially impact the extent of PTA formation. While both exclusion and free riding incentives constrain the expansion to global free trade in a free trade agreement (FTA) game, only the former incentive arises in a customs union (CU) game. When we endogenize the choice between FTAs and CUs, the tension between the flexibility benefit of FTAs and the coordination benefit of CUs reveals that FTAs always serve as PTA building blocks while CUs may serve as PTA building or stumbling blocks.

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来源期刊

Economic Inquiry ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

5.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Published since 1962, (formerly Western Economic Journal), EI is widely regarded as one of the top scholarly journals in its field. Besides containing research on all economics topic areas, a principal objective is to make each article understandable to economists who are not necessarily specialists in the article topic area. Nine Nobel laureates are among EI long list of prestigious authors.