制衡与监督机制对战略进攻程度的调节作用--中国上市软件和信息技术服务业案例研究

Chih-Yi Hsiao, Xiao-Duo Lin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

由于近年来我国经济快速发展导致多起企业无序扩张导致破产的案例,本文以2018-2021年我国软件和信息技术服务业上市公司为研究样本,运用[1]开发的PROCESS V3.5探究制衡机制和监督机制对战略激进程度的调节作用。其中制衡机制包括三权分立程度、股权制衡程度、独立董事比例和双重性。根据实证结果,本文总结出两个结论:1.两权分离程度对战略积极主义程度和投资效率有正向调节作用,尤其是当两权分离程度处于中低水平时。2.当总经理和董事长为同一人时,战略积极性与投资效率之间存在负向调节作用。战略激进程度越高,董事长和总经理合二为一时,投资效率会明显降低。基于以上研究成果,本文为企业提出了相应的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Moderating Role of Checks- and-Balances and Monitoring Mechanisms in the Degree of Strategic Aggressiveness - A Case Study of Chinese Listed Software and IT Services Industry
Due to several cases of bankruptcy caused by uncontrolled corporate expansion due to rapid economic development in China in recent years, this paper takes listed companies in China's software and IT service industry as a research sample from 2018-2021 and uses PROCESS V3.5 developed by [1] to explore the moderating effects of checks-and-balances and supervisory mechanisms on the degree of strategic aggressiveness. Among the check-and-balance mechanisms include the degree of separation of powers, the degree of equity checks-and-balances, the ratio of independent directors, and duality. Based on the empirical results, two conclusions of this paper are summarized: 1. The degree of separation of powers has a positive moderating effect on the degree of strategic activism and investment efficiency, especially when the degree of separation of powers is at a low to medium level. 2. When the general manager and the chairman of the board of directors are the same person, there is a negative moderating effect between the degree of strategic aggressiveness and investment efficiency. The higher the degree of strategic aggressiveness, the investment efficiency will be significantly reduced if the chairman and general manager are combined into one person. Based on the above research results, this paper puts forward corresponding suggestions for enterprises.
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