我中有我还是我中有我?集体意向性与自我

IF 0.2 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Dan Zahavi
{"title":"我中有我还是我中有我?集体意向性与自我","authors":"Dan Zahavi","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2023.78.10.1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality.","PeriodicalId":44340,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"My v Ja alebo Ja v My? Kolektívna intencionalita a jastvo\",\"authors\":\"Dan Zahavi\",\"doi\":\"10.31577/filozofia.2023.78.10.1\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44340,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"FILOZOFIA\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"FILOZOFIA\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2023.78.10.1\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"FILOZOFIA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2023.78.10.1","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

文章对关于集体意向性的主流论述存在个人主义偏见的观点提出质疑,认为应该颠倒解释顺序,将 "我们 "和 "社群 "放在首位。文章讨论了不同版本的社群第一观点,认为这些观点之所以失败,是因为它们对自我的含义的理解过于简单,误解了我们(的一部分)的含义。在提出这一论点的过程中,文章试图证明,对集体意向性的彻底研究必须解决 "我们 "的地位和性质问题,而要做到这一点,就必须分析 "我们 "与 "我 "之间的关系,这反过来又要求比当代集体意向性讨论中惯常的做法更明确地介入自我性问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
My v Ja alebo Ja v My? Kolektívna intencionalita a jastvo
The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
FILOZOFIA
FILOZOFIA PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
66.70%
发文量
31
期刊介绍: Filozofia publishes original articles in a wide range of areas including metaphysics, epistemology, history of philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind, ethics, philosophy of religion and related disciplines. The journal is published monthly, with the exception of July and August, i.e. ten issues yearly. The articles are accepted in Slovak, Czech and English languages.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信