Kant’s Critique of the Wolffian “Mathematical Method” and the Ontological Question of Principles in the Deutlichkeit (1764)

This paper examines some key aspects of Kant’s critique of Wolffian mathematical method in the Deutlichkeit (1764). The aim is to show how the ontological question of principles underlies this critique. To do so, I will first show that Wolff identifies the mathematical method with a universal model of inquiry, which is based on the principles of rationalist ontology. I will therefore focus on a key element of this model, namely that of definition. In doing so, I will be able to show that it is precisely by looking at the process of definition that Kant makes his distinction between the synthetic model of mathematics and the analytic one of philosophy. Finally, I will show that for Kant, albeit differently, both these models are not reducible to the formal principles of rationalist ontology.