官僚何时选择减轻客户负担?随机实验

IF 4.3 2区 管理学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Donavon Johnson, Milena Neshkova
{"title":"官僚何时选择减轻客户负担?随机实验","authors":"Donavon Johnson, Milena Neshkova","doi":"10.1111/padm.12972","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Prior work refers to burdens in citizen-state interactions as administrative, even though most originate from the desk of politicians, not administrators. Even more, bureaucrats often act to unburden their clients via the discretionary powers they wield. This perspective has largely been overlooked in extant research. The present study asks under what conditions bureaucrats alleviate the burdens levied by elected officials on their clients. We propose that bureaucrats are more likely to use their discretion to unburden the most vulnerable groups. The study models vulnerability in terms of age and race, using two single-factorial randomized experiments on a sample of 580 U.S. public managers in a COVID-19 rental assistance setting. We find that client vulnerability drives bureaucrats' intent to unburden, but only in the context of age, not race. Also, the more administrators perceive themselves as public representatives, the higher their intention to unburden aid seekers. By contrast, bureaucrats with higher self-efficacy tend to unburden less.","PeriodicalId":48284,"journal":{"name":"Public Administration","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When do bureaucrats choose to unburden clients: A randomized experiment\",\"authors\":\"Donavon Johnson, Milena Neshkova\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/padm.12972\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Prior work refers to burdens in citizen-state interactions as administrative, even though most originate from the desk of politicians, not administrators. Even more, bureaucrats often act to unburden their clients via the discretionary powers they wield. This perspective has largely been overlooked in extant research. The present study asks under what conditions bureaucrats alleviate the burdens levied by elected officials on their clients. We propose that bureaucrats are more likely to use their discretion to unburden the most vulnerable groups. The study models vulnerability in terms of age and race, using two single-factorial randomized experiments on a sample of 580 U.S. public managers in a COVID-19 rental assistance setting. We find that client vulnerability drives bureaucrats' intent to unburden, but only in the context of age, not race. Also, the more administrators perceive themselves as public representatives, the higher their intention to unburden aid seekers. By contrast, bureaucrats with higher self-efficacy tend to unburden less.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48284,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Public Administration\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Public Administration\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12972\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Public Administration","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12972","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

先前的研究将公民与国家互动中的负担称为行政负担,尽管这些负担大多来自政治家而非行政官员。更有甚者,官僚们往往通过他们所掌握的自由裁量权来为他们的客户减轻负担。现有研究大多忽视了这一视角。本研究探讨了官僚在什么情况下会减轻民选官员对其客户施加的负担。我们认为,官僚更有可能利用其自由裁量权来减轻最弱势群体的负担。本研究以年龄和种族为弱势模型,在 COVID-19 租房援助环境中对 580 名美国公共管理者样本进行了两次单因素随机试验。我们发现,客户的脆弱性会驱使官员有意减轻负担,但这只与年龄有关,与种族无关。此外,管理者将自己视为公众代表的程度越高,他们为求助者减轻负担的意愿就越强。与此相反,自我效能感越高的行政人员越倾向于减轻负担。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When do bureaucrats choose to unburden clients: A randomized experiment
Prior work refers to burdens in citizen-state interactions as administrative, even though most originate from the desk of politicians, not administrators. Even more, bureaucrats often act to unburden their clients via the discretionary powers they wield. This perspective has largely been overlooked in extant research. The present study asks under what conditions bureaucrats alleviate the burdens levied by elected officials on their clients. We propose that bureaucrats are more likely to use their discretion to unburden the most vulnerable groups. The study models vulnerability in terms of age and race, using two single-factorial randomized experiments on a sample of 580 U.S. public managers in a COVID-19 rental assistance setting. We find that client vulnerability drives bureaucrats' intent to unburden, but only in the context of age, not race. Also, the more administrators perceive themselves as public representatives, the higher their intention to unburden aid seekers. By contrast, bureaucrats with higher self-efficacy tend to unburden less.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
17.10%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: Public Administration is a major refereed journal with global circulation and global coverage. The journal publishes articles on public administration, public policy and public management. The journal"s reach is both inclusive and international and much of the work published is comparative in nature. A high percentage of articles are sourced from the enlarging Europe and cover all aspects of West and East European public administration.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信