网络投票与小股东异议:来自中国的证据

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Ning Cai, Wen He, Guoqiang Wu, Xin Yu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

利用中国的提案级数据,我们证明在线投票显著增加了中小股东的投票参与,并且在线投票与更多的反对票有关。在表现不佳的公司中,在线投票与中小股东参与和反对意见之间的关联更强,表明中小股东倾向于参与和反对意见来表达不满。对于拥有更大投票权的股东来说,协会更强大。最后,我们发现,当少数股东的异议未能否决一项提案时,持异议的少数股东不太可能参与并在次年再次投票。我们的研究结果表明,旨在促进中小股东投票的机制导致更多、更知情地参与公司治理过程。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Online voting and minority shareholder dissent: Evidence from China

Using proposal-level data in China, we document that online voting significantly increases minority shareholders’ participation in voting, and online voting is related to more dissenting votes. The association between online voting and minority shareholders’ participation and dissent is stronger in underperforming firms, indicating that minority shareholders tend to participate and dissent to express dissatisfaction. The association is stronger for shareholders with stronger voting power. Finally, we find that when minority shareholders’ dissent fails to veto a proposal, dissenting minority shareholders are less likely to participate and vote again the following year. Our results suggest that mechanisms designed to facilitate minority shareholder voting lead to greater and more informed participation in the corporate governance process.

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来源期刊
Financial Management
Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: Financial Management (FM) serves both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, and public or private not-for-profit organizations.
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