司法腐败

Sultan Mehmood, Bakhtawar Ali
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们使用来自巴基斯坦的数据来建立司法部门和政府之间的互惠交流关系。我们记录了从政府向司法机构以昂贵房地产的形式进行的大规模转移,以及从司法机构向政府以亲政府裁决的形式进行的回报。我们的估计表明,法官的席位分配增加了亲政府的裁决,减少了对案件案情的裁决。这一分配也给政府带来了GDP的0.03%的累积成本。然而,它允许政府在一年内征收相当于GDP 0.2%的额外土地。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Judicial Capture
We use data from Pakistan to establish a reciprocal exchange relationship between the judiciary and the government. We document large transfers in the form of expensive real estate from the government to the judiciary, and reciprocation in the form of pro-government rulings from the judiciary to the government. Our estimates indicate that the allocation of houses to judges increases pro-government rulings and reduces decisions on case merits. The allocation also incurs a cumulative cost of 0.03% of GDP to the government. However, it allows the government to expropriate additional land worth 0.2% of GDP in one year.
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