{"title":"基于学习游戏的任务边缘资源分配方法","authors":"Zuopeng Li, Hengshuai Ju, Zepeng Ren","doi":"10.3390/fi15120395","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The existing research on dependent task offloading and resource allocation assumes that edge servers can provide computational and communication resources free of charge. This paper proposes a two-stage resource allocation method to address this issue. In the first stage, users incentivize edge servers to provide resources. We formulate the incentive problem in this stage as a multivariate Stackelberg game, which takes into account both computational and communication resources. In addition, we also analyze the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium under information sharing conditions. Considering the privacy issues of the participants, the research is extended to scenarios without information sharing, where the multivariable game problem is modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). In order to obtain the optimal incentive decision in this scenario, a reinforcement learning algorithm based on the learning game is designed. In the second stage, we propose a greedy-based deep reinforcement learning algorithm that is aimed at minimizing task execution time by optimizing resource and task allocation strategies. Finally, the simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm designed for non-information sharing scenarios can effectively approximate the theoretical Stackelberg equilibrium, and its performance is found to be better than that of the other three benchmark methods. After the allocation of resources and sub-tasks by the greedy-based deep reinforcement learning algorithm, the execution delay of the dependent task is significantly lower than that in local processing.","PeriodicalId":37982,"journal":{"name":"Future Internet","volume":"67 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Learning Game-Based Approach to Task-Dependent Edge Resource Allocation\",\"authors\":\"Zuopeng Li, Hengshuai Ju, Zepeng Ren\",\"doi\":\"10.3390/fi15120395\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The existing research on dependent task offloading and resource allocation assumes that edge servers can provide computational and communication resources free of charge. This paper proposes a two-stage resource allocation method to address this issue. In the first stage, users incentivize edge servers to provide resources. We formulate the incentive problem in this stage as a multivariate Stackelberg game, which takes into account both computational and communication resources. In addition, we also analyze the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium under information sharing conditions. Considering the privacy issues of the participants, the research is extended to scenarios without information sharing, where the multivariable game problem is modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). In order to obtain the optimal incentive decision in this scenario, a reinforcement learning algorithm based on the learning game is designed. In the second stage, we propose a greedy-based deep reinforcement learning algorithm that is aimed at minimizing task execution time by optimizing resource and task allocation strategies. Finally, the simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm designed for non-information sharing scenarios can effectively approximate the theoretical Stackelberg equilibrium, and its performance is found to be better than that of the other three benchmark methods. After the allocation of resources and sub-tasks by the greedy-based deep reinforcement learning algorithm, the execution delay of the dependent task is significantly lower than that in local processing.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37982,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Future Internet\",\"volume\":\"67 6\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Future Internet\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15120395\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Future Internet","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15120395","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Learning Game-Based Approach to Task-Dependent Edge Resource Allocation
The existing research on dependent task offloading and resource allocation assumes that edge servers can provide computational and communication resources free of charge. This paper proposes a two-stage resource allocation method to address this issue. In the first stage, users incentivize edge servers to provide resources. We formulate the incentive problem in this stage as a multivariate Stackelberg game, which takes into account both computational and communication resources. In addition, we also analyze the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium under information sharing conditions. Considering the privacy issues of the participants, the research is extended to scenarios without information sharing, where the multivariable game problem is modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). In order to obtain the optimal incentive decision in this scenario, a reinforcement learning algorithm based on the learning game is designed. In the second stage, we propose a greedy-based deep reinforcement learning algorithm that is aimed at minimizing task execution time by optimizing resource and task allocation strategies. Finally, the simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm designed for non-information sharing scenarios can effectively approximate the theoretical Stackelberg equilibrium, and its performance is found to be better than that of the other three benchmark methods. After the allocation of resources and sub-tasks by the greedy-based deep reinforcement learning algorithm, the execution delay of the dependent task is significantly lower than that in local processing.
Future InternetComputer Science-Computer Networks and Communications
CiteScore
7.10
自引率
5.90%
发文量
303
审稿时长
11 weeks
期刊介绍:
Future Internet is a scholarly open access journal which provides an advanced forum for science and research concerned with evolution of Internet technologies and related smart systems for “Net-Living” development. The general reference subject is therefore the evolution towards the future internet ecosystem, which is feeding a continuous, intensive, artificial transformation of the lived environment, for a widespread and significant improvement of well-being in all spheres of human life (private, public, professional). Included topics are: • advanced communications network infrastructures • evolution of internet basic services • internet of things • netted peripheral sensors • industrial internet • centralized and distributed data centers • embedded computing • cloud computing • software defined network functions and network virtualization • cloud-let and fog-computing • big data, open data and analytical tools • cyber-physical systems • network and distributed operating systems • web services • semantic structures and related software tools • artificial and augmented intelligence • augmented reality • system interoperability and flexible service composition • smart mission-critical system architectures • smart terminals and applications • pro-sumer tools for application design and development • cyber security compliance • privacy compliance • reliability compliance • dependability compliance • accountability compliance • trust compliance • technical quality of basic services.