股价暴跌风险与公司控制权市场

IF 4.5 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Nicholas F. Carline, Yang Gao, Jing-Ming Kuo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

最近的研究表明,公司控制权市场的风险越大,对管理者和股东就越重要,因为它会影响公司股价暴跌的事后风险。但研究结果对这种影响的方向提出了质疑。与此相反,在本研究中,我们首次考察了公司遭遇股价暴跌的事前风险的影响,其前因后果可能是管理者隐瞒了公司控制权市场方面的消息。我们发现,股价暴跌风险越高,收购目标的可能性就越大。这种关系在很大程度上取决于较低的管理质量和管理者在财务应计方面的更大自由裁量权,这种关系在适当规避反向因果关系方面是稳健的,从而更深刻地揭示了管理者行为的纠正是公司控制权市场的刺激因素,但这种刺激因素取决于管理者隐瞒消息的可能程度。我们还同时发现,崩盘风险较高的实际收购目标会产生较低的出价溢价,并获得更多的股票支付。总之,我们的研究结果有力地表明,公司控制权市场的决策至少部分是由与机会主义价格和柠檬收购相关的激励机制所解释的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Stock Price Crash Risk and the Market for Corporate Control

Recent studies suggest that greater exposure to the market for corporate control matters for managers and shareholders since it affects firms’ ex-post risk of experiencing a stock price crash. The findings though question the direction of the effect. In contrast, in this study, we are the first to examine the effects of firms’ ex-ante risk of experiencing a stock price crash, a likely antecedent of which is managers’ concealment of news on aspects of the market for corporate control. We find that higher crash risk leads to greater takeover target likelihood. This relationship, which is robust to duly circumventing reverse causality, depends to a significant extent on inferior managerial quality and greater managerial discretion around financial accruals, affording richer insight into the notion that correction of managerial behaviour is a stimulus for the market for corporate control, but one that depends on the likely extent of managers’ concealment of news. We also concurrently find that actual takeover targets with higher crash risk generate a lower bid premium and receive more payment with stock. Overall, our findings strongly suggest that decision-making in the market for corporate control is at least partially explained by incentives linked to opportunistic prices and takeovers of lemons.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
12.50%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: The British Journal of Management provides a valuable outlet for research and scholarship on management-orientated themes and topics. It publishes articles of a multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary nature as well as empirical research from within traditional disciplines and managerial functions. With contributions from around the globe, the journal includes articles across the full range of business and management disciplines. A subscription to British Journal of Management includes International Journal of Management Reviews, also published on behalf of the British Academy of Management.
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