CEO年龄、财务报告质量和追回条款的作用

IF 3.3 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Justin G. Davis, Miguel Garcia-Cestona
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引用次数: 0

摘要

受美国快速增长的CEO年龄的激励,本研究的目的是分析CEO年龄对财务报告质量的影响,并考虑回扣条款的调节作用。本研究使用了从2003年到2019年的18492个美国公司年度观察数据集。财务报告质量由基于权责发生制和真实活动的盈余管理措施,以及通过将本福德定律应用于财务报表项目来衡量的财务报表违规行为来代表。进行了一些灵敏度测试,包括使用工具变量。研究结果表明,CEO年龄越大,财务报表违规行为就越普遍,这表明CEO年龄与真实活动盈余管理之间存在复杂关系。研究结果还表明,CEO年龄对财务报告质量的影响被追回条款的存在所调节,追回条款于2022年10月成为美国上市公司的强制性规定。原创性/价值本研究是作者所知的第一个考虑CEO年龄对财务报表违规和盈余管理影响的研究。本研究对利益相关者评估财务报告质量的决定因素、考虑CEO年龄限制的董事会和考虑强制追回条款的政策制定者具有重要意义,这些最近发生在美国。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
CEO age, financial reporting quality, and the role of clawback provisions

Purpose

Motivated by rapidly increasing CEO age in the USA, the purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality and consider the moderating role of clawback provisions.

Design/methodology/approach

This study uses a data set of 18,492 US firm-year observations from 2003 to 2019. Financial reporting quality is proxied with accruals-based and real activities earnings management measures, and with financial statement irregularities, measured by applying Benford’s law to financial statement line items. A number of sensitivity tests are conducted including the use of an instrumental variable.

Findings

The results provide evidence that financial statement irregularities are more prevalent when CEOs are older, and they suggest a complex relation between CEO age and real activities earnings management. The results also suggest that the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality is moderated by the presence of clawback provisions which became mandatory for US-listed firms in October 2022.

Originality/value

This study is the first, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to consider the effect of CEO age on financial statement irregularities and earnings management. This study has important implications for stakeholders evaluating the determinants of financial reporting quality, for boards of directors considering CEO age limitations and for policymakers considering mandating clawback provisions, which recently occurred in the USA.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.80
自引率
16.00%
发文量
65
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