管理堑壕与人才市场

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Corporate Finance Studies Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI:10.1093/rcfs/cfac028

Fabio Feriozzi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了管理技能的性质如何影响企业的治理决策。随着所需技能从公司特定技能转向更普遍的技能，从外部招聘取代表现不佳的CEO对股东来说更有利可图。因此，企业采取更强有力的治理安排，以限制现任首席执行官的固守，并利用市场为人才提供的更好的机会。该分析合理化了观察到的更强公司治理的趋势，并提供了关于管理堑壕、公司规模和管理技能性质之间关系的新颖实证预测。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for Talent

This paper studies how the nature of managerial skills affects firms’ governance decisions. As required skills shift from firm specific toward more general abilities, replacing an underperforming CEO with an outside hire becomes more profitable for shareholders. Therefore, firms adopt stronger governance arrangements to limit the entrenchment of incumbent CEOs and exploit the improved opportunities offered by the market for talent. The analysis rationalizes the observed trend toward stronger corporate governance and offers novel empirical predictions concerning the relationship between managerial entrenchment, firm size, and the nature of managerial skills.

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来源期刊

Review of Corporate Finance Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

17.80

自引率

1.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.