极端政党和政治租金

R. Emre Aytimur
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摘要

摘要研究比例代表制下政党的寻租行为。在我们的模型中,议会的最终政策选择是各政党政策立场的加权平均值,权重是他们的投票份额。极端政党选择比温和政党更高的租金水平,以换取更大的政策影响力,除非在某些不太可能的政党分布情况下。此外,即使是自由进入,政治租金也不会被消除,除非进入成本非常低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Extreme Parties and Political Rents
AbstractWe study the rent-seeking behavior of political parties in a proportional representation system. In our model, the final policy choice of the parliament is a weighted average of parties’ policy positions, weights being their vote shares. An extreme party chooses a higher rent level than a moderate party in exchange for greater policy influence, except in some cases of unlikely distributions of parties. Moreover, political rents are not eliminated even with free entry, unless the entry cost is arbitrarily small.
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