非流通股股利与公司派息政策:股利等值权分析

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Z. Tingting Jia, Don M. Chance
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们调查了一种鲜为人知的高管薪酬手段——股息等价物,这是一些期权和基于业绩的股权奖励的条款,允许高管获得他们不拥有的股票的股息,这些股票可能最终永远不会拥有。我们发现,多达30%的样本公司有这一政策。虽然股息等价物可能会加剧代理问题,但它们对现金持有量有积极影响,并有助于调整激励措施——有股息等价物政策的公司倾向于支付股息,而支付股息等价物的公司倾向于支付更高的股息,并保留更少的多余现金。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Dividends on Unearned Shares and Corporate Payout Policy: An Analysis of Dividend Equivalent Rights

We investigate a little-known executive compensation device called dividend equivalents, which are provisions on some options and performance-based equity awards permitting executives to receive dividends on shares not owned and which they may ultimately never own. We find that up to 30% of sample firms have had this policy. While dividend equivalents may appear to exacerbate agency problems, they have a positive impact on cash holdings and help align incentives — firms with dividend equivalent policies tend to pay dividends, and firms that make dividend equivalent payments tend to pay higher dividends and keep lower excess cash.

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来源期刊
Quarterly Journal of Finance
Quarterly Journal of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
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0
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Journal of Finance publishes high-quality papers in all areas of finance, including corporate finance, asset pricing, financial econometrics, international finance, macro-finance, behavioral finance, banking and financial intermediation, capital markets, risk management and insurance, derivatives, quantitative finance, corporate governance and compensation, investments and entrepreneurial finance.
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