债券投资者对金融机构尾部风险敞口定价吗?

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Sudheer Chava, Rohan Ganduri, Vijay Yerramilli
{"title":"债券投资者对金融机构尾部风险敞口定价吗?","authors":"Sudheer Chava, Rohan Ganduri, Vijay Yerramilli","doi":"10.1142/s2010139221500038","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze whether bond investors price tail risk exposures of financial institutions using a comprehensive sample of bond issuances by U.S. financial institutions. Although primary bond yield spreads increase with an institution’s own tail risk (expected shortfall), systematic tail risk (marginal expected shortfall) of the institution doesn’t affect its yields. The relationship between yield spreads and tail risk is significantly weaker for depository institutions, large institutions, government-sponsored entities, politically-connected institutions, and in periods following large-scale bailouts of financial institutions. Overall, our results suggest that implicit bailout guarantees of financial institutions can exacerbate moral hazard in bond markets and weaken market discipline.","PeriodicalId":45339,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Finance","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do Bond Investors Price Tail Risk Exposures of Financial Institutions?\",\"authors\":\"Sudheer Chava, Rohan Ganduri, Vijay Yerramilli\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/s2010139221500038\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We analyze whether bond investors price tail risk exposures of financial institutions using a comprehensive sample of bond issuances by U.S. financial institutions. Although primary bond yield spreads increase with an institution’s own tail risk (expected shortfall), systematic tail risk (marginal expected shortfall) of the institution doesn’t affect its yields. The relationship between yield spreads and tail risk is significantly weaker for depository institutions, large institutions, government-sponsored entities, politically-connected institutions, and in periods following large-scale bailouts of financial institutions. Overall, our results suggest that implicit bailout guarantees of financial institutions can exacerbate moral hazard in bond markets and weaken market discipline.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45339,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quarterly Journal of Finance\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-11-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quarterly Journal of Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139221500038\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quarterly Journal of Finance","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139221500038","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

我们使用美国金融机构债券发行的综合样本来分析债券投资者是否为金融机构的尾部风险敞口定价。虽然一级债券收益率息差随着机构自身尾部风险(预期缺口)的增大而增大,但机构的系统性尾部风险(边际预期缺口)并不影响其收益率。对于存款机构、大型机构、政府支持的实体、有政治关系的机构,以及在大规模救助金融机构之后的时期,收益率息差与尾部风险之间的关系明显较弱。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,金融机构的隐性救助担保会加剧债券市场的道德风险,削弱市场纪律。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do Bond Investors Price Tail Risk Exposures of Financial Institutions?
We analyze whether bond investors price tail risk exposures of financial institutions using a comprehensive sample of bond issuances by U.S. financial institutions. Although primary bond yield spreads increase with an institution’s own tail risk (expected shortfall), systematic tail risk (marginal expected shortfall) of the institution doesn’t affect its yields. The relationship between yield spreads and tail risk is significantly weaker for depository institutions, large institutions, government-sponsored entities, politically-connected institutions, and in periods following large-scale bailouts of financial institutions. Overall, our results suggest that implicit bailout guarantees of financial institutions can exacerbate moral hazard in bond markets and weaken market discipline.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Quarterly Journal of Finance
Quarterly Journal of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Journal of Finance publishes high-quality papers in all areas of finance, including corporate finance, asset pricing, financial econometrics, international finance, macro-finance, behavioral finance, banking and financial intermediation, capital markets, risk management and insurance, derivatives, quantitative finance, corporate governance and compensation, investments and entrepreneurial finance.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信